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VOLUME 26 JANUARY 1981 NUMBER 2
SEX-BASED CONSIDERATIONS OF DIFFERENTIATION IN
THE WORKPLACE: EXPLORING THE BIOMEDICAL
INTERFACE BETWEEN OSHA AND TITLE VII
GARY Z. NOTHSTEIN t
JEFFREY P. AYRs tt
Willow Island, W. Va., is a "wide place in the road,"
says one man who knows the place. It's a bleak spot in a
depressed region, and one of the few local employers
offering jobs at decent pay is the American Cyanamid Co.
plant.
All of which had more than a little to do with the
decision last year of [two women,] [Betty] Moler and
[Barbara] Cantwell to have themselves sterilized....
[They were afraid] of losing [their jobs] in the
[chemical] pigments division of the American Cyanamid
plant, where a potential health hazard caused the company
last year to restrict certain jobs to men or women not capa-
ble of child-bearing.' A disconcerting result was the deci-
sion of [Moler, Cantwell and three] other women workers
to be sterilized.
t Partner, Venable, Baetjer & Howard, Baltimore, Maryland and Wash-
ington, D.C. B.A., Johns Hopkins University (1969); J.D., Ohio State Uni-
versity College of Law (1973); LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center
(1974). Member, District of Columbia, Maryland and Ohio bars.
IfiAssociate, Venable, Baetjer & Howard, Baltimore, Maryland and Wash-
ington, D.C. B.A., Harvard University (1974); J.D., George Washington Uni-
versity National Law Center (1977). Member, District of Columbia and
Maryland bars.
The authors wish to express their gratitude to Augustus T. White, Ph.D.
(Biochemistry), Johns Hopkins University (1978); J.D., Yale Law School
(1981), for his invaluable technical assistance.
1. Contrary to reports, job restriction at American Cyanamid was based
on the ability and desire to bear children, and applied to both sexes, not just
women. [1979] Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 466.
(239)
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Their situation, and similar events involving women
workers at Allied Chemical Corp., have dramatized an
occupational health problem confronting corporations
around the nation that deal with hazardous substances: the
possibility of damaging the unborn child.2
Petrochemical companies have quietly tested thousands
of American workers to determine if any of the genes they
were born with are what industry doctors call "defective,"
making the employees especially vulnerable to certain
chemicals in the workplace. The process is called genetic
screening.
Employers say the purpose of the tests is to provide a
protective barrier, keeping workers they term "hypersus-
ceptible" away from industrial poisons. It is unclear if
any workers have been denied employment because of their
genes, but there is ample evidence that many workers have
been transferred to other jobs.
Some scientists, union leaders and industrial hygien-
ists reject assertions that the tests protect workers. Such
critics regard genetic screening as a Brave New World
nightmare, an Orwellian stew in which the victims of toxic
chemicals will be blamed for having faulty genes.
They say that the genetic approach is indeed a bar-
rier, but one that threatens workers with sexual, racial or
ethnic discrimination. They oppose an employment
philosophy that would label a particular group of people as
unfit for certain jobs because of their genetic makeup.
This approach, they say, thus shifts the focus of the prob-
lem to the genes of workers, rather than to the presence
of industrial poisons in the workplace.8
2. Bronson, Issue of Fetal Damage Stirs Women Workers at Chemical Plant,
Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1979, at 1, col. 1 (emphasis added).
3. Severo, The Genetic Barrier: Job Benefit or job Bias?, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 3, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 1. For an opposing view on this issue, consider
the following:
Recently the Coke Oven Standard Setting process disclosed that
women workers are being hired into coke ovens as New Hires, even
though it's been known for over 200 years that these ovens are
cancer breeders in all humans and more recently that benzo(a).
pyrene, a major coke oven pollutant, is transplacental to the unborn
tetus. This cynical steel industry hiring policy which is being done in
the name of equal employment must be terminated by immediate
government action.
Labor Safety & Health Institute, Statement, in PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE ON
WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 362 (E. Bingham ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE].
[VOL. 26: p. 239
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D URING THE PAST DECADE, a substantial change has oc-
curred in the employment of women in industry. A review of
the hiring practices of many large industries shows that while many
jobs were previously restricted to male workers, the present policy is
to hire females for almost any job for which they are qualified.4 In
fact, forty percent of the workforce in the United States today con-
sists of women, who are entering the job market at a rate of almost
two million per year. Some of these women have found employment
in the chemical industry which has developed significantly in the
past century due to mankind's increased use of chemicals. Expo-
sure to some of these chemicals has had unintentional, adverse, and
occasionally chronic results, and has presented certain problems
unique to the regulation of toxic materials in the workplace.5
This article will discuss one of these problems - the potential
conflict between occupational safety and health legislation, mainly
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA or the
Act)," and civil rights legislation directed at fair employment prac-
tices, mainly Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII).7 The conflict between OSHA and Title VII arises because
the conditions of employment in a particular workplace may re-
quire exposure to chemical agents that are either toxic to one sex
and not to the other, toxic to the human reproductive process in
4. The increased employment of women has been due largely to the with-
drawal of protective legislation. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
STATE LABOR LAWS IN TRANSITION: FROM PROTECTION TO EQUAL STATUS 6
(1976).
5. Serevo, supra note 3, § 1, at 36, col. 6.
6. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (most of the Act has been codified
in 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976)). This legislation, the result of over 20 years of
debate and a concerted two-year effort to pass job safety and health legislation,
authorizes the establishment, adoption, and enforcement of standards to pro-
tect employees from a variety of occupational hazards. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 655,
659 (1976). At the time of its passage, Congress noted that there were over
14,500 job-related deaths annually and an unknown number of illnesses and
injuries resulting from or complicated by exposure to safety and health hazards,
including toxic substances in the work environment. S. RErp. No. 91-1282,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &: AD. NEws 5177,
5178 [hereinafter cited as Senate OSHA Report].
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). Title VII prohibits discrimination
by employers on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, or national origin. Id.
§ 2000e-2. While giving women the right to be hired on an equal basis with
men, the legislation also permits women to be exposed to the same industrial
hazards as men. Unfortunately for women, however, most of our present
knowledge of occupational safety and health hazards is derived from experi-
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either sex, or toxic to the fetus but not to the adult. In such
situations, employers who exclude susceptible men or women from
the workplace in order to avoid exposing them to toxic agents, risk
violating Title VII. The issue, then, is whether these employers
should protect their employees and themselves 8 by removing sus-
ceptible persons from certain jobs or by making the workplace risk-
free by undertaking the economically and technologically difficult,
and often infeasible, task of eliminating all toxic hazards.9
The foregoing concerns raised with respect to sex may apply
equally well to other suspect classifications - handicap, age, race,
national origin - and, less well, to religion. Individuals in these
"protected groups" may possess characteristics or traits that would
render them particularly susceptible to health threats.10 The con-
8. Employers are subject to suits by employees and citations from OSHA.
9. Severo, supra note 3, § I, at 1, col. 2.
10. A recent series of articles on genetic screening (cytogenetics) noted
the existence of gene variations associated with sex, race, and ethnic back-
ground. See id. § 1, at 36, col. 1. Some members of these groups have genet-
ically caused blood disorders that may place them at special risk when work-
ing with many chemicals, e.g., benzene, nitrosoamines, nitrates, and lead. Id.
Alcoholics and persons with breathing difficulties, such as asthma and em-
physema, are very susceptible to exposures to chemicals in the workplace and
arguably are protected as handicapped individuals under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976), as amended by Rehabilitation, Com-
prehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2984-3001. A handicapped individual is defined as
"any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706
(7)(B) (1976). The regulations further define major life activities to include
caring for one's self, walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, speaking, and working.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1979) (emphasis added). These regulations imply that
employers may have special obligations toward handicapped employees. See
generally Guy, The Developing Law On Equal Employment Opportunity For
The Handicapped: An Overview And Analysis Of The Major Issues, 7 U.
BALT. L. REv. 183 (1978).
Hearing levels may differ significantly due to race and sex. In general, the
black female population has the lowest, or most sensitive, hearing threshold,
while the white male population has the least sensitive. The black male and
white female populations' hearing thresholds fall between these two extremes
and become similar as these populations age. The percentage of workers "po-
tentially compensable" for hearing loss or affected by noise levels on the job is
thus "strongly dependent" on the race and sex of the population. [1979] Occ.
SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 64.
Most cancers are strongly age-dependent. Cancer is a disease of old age
"because natural selection would be expected to have led to the evolution of
defense mechanisms that operate early in life .... .. " OSHA Final Rule on
Identification, Classification and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcino-
gens, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5026 (1980) (codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1990 (1980)) [here-
inafter cited as Carcinogen Standard]. Children of peripubertal ages are also
extremely susceptible to the effects of exposure to toxic substances. See National
Ass'n of Farmworkers Organizations v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604, 607 n.6 (D.C.
[VOL. 26: p. 239
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flict addressed in this article would occur any time that exposure
to equal environments causes unequal physical and legal conse-
quences. In this light, the problem is a manifestation of the same
question that has haunted the legal system since the passage of the
fourteenth amendment: to what extent does equal protection re-
quire equal treatment and to what extent equal results?
II. ARE ALL [WO]MEN CREATED EQUAL?
A. Diflerential Toxicity 1
The physiological, metabolic, and biochemical differences be-
tween men and women tend to be relatively minor. The main
physical differences are in the area of gonadal function and place-
Cir. 1980) (prohibiting use of child labor to harvest crops sprayed with certain
pesticides).
Another possible example of the conflict between particular classifications
and employment practices appears in the Department of Transportation's Fed-
eral Highway Administration regulations on the Qualifications of Drivers, which
provide that persons with certain "physical defects," including loss of foot, leg,
hand or arm; diabetes; respiratory dysfunction; high blood pressure; epilepsy;
alcoholism; and drug addiction, may not drive a motor vehicle. See 49 C.F.R.
§§ 391.41-.49 (1980). It would appear that such regulations may place employers
who follow them squarely in conflict with the Rehabilitation Act.
11. Toxicity is the inherent capacity of a substance to cause injury to bio-
logical tissue. "Hazard is a function of toxicity and exposure and is the proba-
bility that injury will result from the use of a substance in a given formulation,
quantity, or manner." Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 131 n.17 (5th Cir. 1974). Toxicology is the study of the
noxious effects of chemical and physical agents. In order to understand how
life can be maintained under conditions of exposure to toxic agents, toxicology
requires an understanding of the concept of dose-response relationships. This
most fundamental concept of toxicology states that a relationship exists between
the dose of an agent and the response that is produced in a biological system.
See N. PROCTOR & J. HUGHES, CHEMICAL HAZARDS OF THE WORKPLACE 4-6 (1978).
For many toxic substances, especially carcinogens, a relationship between dose
and response exists. Three assumptions are made in determining the relation-
ship: 1) the magnitude of the biologic response is a function of the concentra-
tion of the agent at the biologic site of action; 2) the concentration at the site
of action is a function of the dose administered; and 3) the response and the
dose are causally related. When the toxicity data is determined, a range of
doses is found which results in some deaths and some survivals. See, e.g.,
Carcinogen Standard, supra note 10, at 5118-38; T. LooMis, ESSENTIALS Op
TOXICOLOGY 63-75 (2d ed. 1974); Amdur, Industrial Toxicology, in NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
& WELFARE, NIOSH PUB. No. 74-117, THE INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT - ITS
EVALUATION AND CONTROL 61-73 (1973). See generally L. CASARETr & J. DOULL,
ToxICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISON (1975). Unfortunately, however,
present knowledge indicates that carcinogenic hazard does not disappear en-
tirely with a diminishing dose, but rather becomes infinitely small. Individuals
exposed to a carcinogen generally remain at increased risk of developing cancer
even after exposure has ceased. See Carcinogen Standard, supra, at 5024-25;
Legator, The Chemical Environment & Mutagenesis, in WOMEN AND THE WORK-
PLACE, supra note a, at 5, 14.
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ment.1 For toxicological purposes, however, the gonadal position
is less important than the significant gonadal difference in metab-
olism.18 The testes are metabolically very active tissues, constantly
in the process of producing sperm cells. Chemical damage is thus
likely to be immediate and acute, but if sexual function survives
at all, transient. By contrast, the ovaries are more quiescent.
Oocyte production ceases at or before the time of birth, and meta-
bolic activity thereafter is comparatively minor. Thus, chemical
damage, if it occurs, is likely to be less severe in women, because a
slowly metabolizing organ, having less need of nutrients, will tend
to have less exposure to toxins in the blood. On the other hand,
any resultant damage is more likely to be permanent.
The foregoing discussion may overstate the physiological and
biochemical differences between men and women. Gonads of both
sexes have the same embryonic origin and thus a similar biochem-
istry.14  Both perform important secondary functions as endocrine
12. The focus of this article's discussion is on physical differences which
are significant toxicologically. Various other differences, however, can affect
ergonometric considerations, that is those considerations which address the basic
mechanics of bodily adaption to the workplace. See R. O'Connel, Women At
Work (October 31, 1978) (paper presented at National Safety Congress-Health
Hazards Affecting Pregnant Women in the Workplace). Women are statistically
smaller and weaker than men and their muscle mass is generally less than in
men. This may put women at a disadvantage in the tasks of lifting and mov-
ing. See Conibear, Women as a High Risk Population, in WOMEN AND THE
WORKPLACE, supra note 3, at 168-70. The bone structure of women is lighter
and more slender than men's and the angles and positions of some bones differ
between the sexes, resulting in a somewhat different organ placement. R.
O'Connel, supra, at 3. The woman's pelvis, of course, is physically larger for
childbearing. Id. The practical effect is perhaps only to make women slightly
more susceptible to low back injury and to internal injuries in cases of violent
accidents. See Chaffin, Hazards Relating to Personal Physical Strengths, in
WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE, supra, at 174 (emphasizing that "strength is the
attribute that discriminates here, not sex").
There are also definite soft tissue variations in the bladder, the repro-
ductive organs, and the rectum. Childbirth can weaken the supports for
these organs and adversely affect their functions. R. O'Connel, supra, at 3-6.
Urinary difficulties, dropping of the uterus, and rectal protrusion are just a
few examples of the difficulties that can arise as a result of childbirth. Id.
Jobs that require heavy lifting, moving, or straining naturally may aggravate
these anatomical abnormalities that follow childbirth.
Psychological considerations, including premenstrual irritability and meno-
pausal depression, should also be considered. Id. In addition, women differ
from men genetically in that they have two "X" chromosones rather than one
"X" and one "Y. In terms of certain industrial exposures, this may make
women superior in resistance and susceptibility. See Discussion, in WOMEN
AND THE WORKPLACE, supra, at 84 (statement of Dr. Charles Shaw).
13. Testes are more exposed to hazards than ovaries by virtue of their
location, but this is less significant than the fact that sperm cells are always
dividing and thus are more susceptible to mutations which frequently occur
during cell division. Conibear, supra note 12, at 170.
14. B. PATEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 470 (3d ed. 1968).
[VOL. 26: p. 239
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glands, producing closely related populations of hormones. It
appears that, excluding childbearing differences,"5 "men and women
are more alike than different in terms of biochemical and physio-
logic processes." 16 Thus, a toxic substance that affects the gonads of
one sex, a mutagen,"7 probably will affect those of the other.'8 The
manifestations of disease may be different, but the underlying bio-
chemistry is likely to be similar. For example, carbon disulfide
15. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text infra.
16. B. PATrEN, supra note 14. See also Severo, supra note 3, § 1, at 36,
col. 6.
17. Mutagenicity is the term applied to the alteration of germ plasma, in
both males and females, which is induced by a variety of physical and chemical
processes whereby future generations are impaired. The Carcinogen Standard
reports that there is a close relationship between mutagenesis and carcino-
genesis. The Carcinogen Standard, supra note 10, at 5120. A mutagenic sub.
stance damages genetic material and may also cause chromosomal damage.
In terms of mutagenesis, science distinguishes between two types: one affects
somatic (non-germ) cells of the exposed person and may cause malignancy; the
other affects germ cells and is transmitted to future generations. For a dis-
cussion of chromosomal chemical mutagenesis, see Claxton & Barry, Chemical
Mutagenesis, An Emerging Issue for Public Health, 67 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1037 (1977).
18. The problems are exascerbated by the fact that awareness of parent.
hood does not occur until after a critical ontogenic period during which injury
may already have occurred. D. Teitlebaum, Information and the Prevention
of Genetic Injury 4-7 (October 15, 1979) (paper presented at a National Safety
Congress Session). This is particularly important when one considers the
mutagenic activity of certain substances which occurs before conception. The
resultant cost of environmental genetic damage and birth defects is immense
in both human and economic terms. The concentration on carcinogenesis as
it relates to industry has often obscured the time extent of the economic dam.
ages caused by cancers which occur in an occupational setting. The immediate
economic effects of cancers caused by the occupational environment are
measurable and finite. The cancer dies with the employee. The effects of
genetic damage, however, may persist for many generations. Immense costs
are inflicted upon future generations which must provide care for the defective
offspring of genetically damaged ancestors. For example, the cost of care for
patients with 21-Trisomy (Down's Syndrome, the disease commonly known as
mongolism), a disorder of chromosome structure, is over $4,000,000,000 per
year in the United States alone. A few such mutations should convince us
that prevention, even on the most conservative basis, is certainly justifiable
on economic grounds alone.
Certain types of toxic substances other than mutagens also affect the
gonads. A gametotoxic substance affects the egg or sperm cell and may limit
ertility. A teratogenic substance is one which, although it may not affect the
adult worker, may directly affect the fetus. Teratogens may cause structural
malformations, metabolic or physiological dysfunctions, and psychological or
behavioral alterations in infants, which become evident at birth or in the im-
mediate postnatal period. If the change results in stillbirth or in-utero death,
the effect is more properly called embryotoxic or fetotoxic. If a substance is
strictly a teratogen, only women's reproductive processes can be affected. Fetuses
of wives of exposed male employees, however, may also be affected by terato-
gens. See generally A. HmaCKO, WORXING FOR YOUR LIFE: A WoMAN's GUIw
TO JOB HAzARDs (1976); 2 G. VAN GELDER, CLINICAL AND DIAGNOSTIC VET-
ERINARY TOXICOLOGY (2d ed. 1978).
1980-811
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appears to interfere with gonadal endocrine function in both sexes,
resulting primarily in male impotency but also, to a lesser extent,
in female menstrual disorders. 19 Little dose-response information
exists, but it also would seem that these effects occur at about the
same level of severity in males and females. Of course, this does
not mean that there are no toxic substances that have sex-specific
effects.20 On the whole, however, the reasoned hypothesis of spe-
cial susceptibility because of sex is largely without basis. 21
A second reason for the relative lack of toxicological difference
between the sexes is that those organs that are different are among
those least likely to be poisoned. In the industrial environment,
almost all toxic agents enter the body through inhalation. 22 The
lungs, therefore, are the first and most strongly exposed organs.
After initially irritating contacted tissue, the toxin will be absorbed
into the blood bringing about further distribution and possible
systemic intoxication. In order to remain in the body, the sub-
stance must survive screening by the liver and the renal system,
organs with large blood volume which are specialized for detoxifi-
cation and excretion. As a result of this pattern, the disorders from
exposure to toxic substances are usually pulmonary, hemotological,
hepatic, and renal.
23
Finally, although some sex-specific reactions have been ob-
served, these observations are difficult to confirm in the absence of
19. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, NIOSH PUB. No. 77-181, OCCUPATIONAL Dis-
EASES: A GUIDE TO THEIR RECOGNITION 307 (rev. ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES].
20. Recent data indicates, for example, that the only effect of exposure
to certain toxic agricultural chemicals is male impotence. Warshaw, Non-
Medical Issues Presented by the Pregnant Worker, 21 J. OCC. MED. 89, 91
(1979).
21. "There is very little scientific data to support this [hypothesis of spe-
cial susceptibility], and . . . one must be careful not to attribute apparent dif-
ferences to biochemical mechanisms until social conditions . . . have been ruled
out." Conibear, supra note 12, at 170.
22. N. PROCTOR & J. HUGHES, supra note 11, at 4. The second most pre-
valent route of entry is contact with the skin. Although the gastrointestinal
tract is also a potential site of absorption, the ingestion of significant amounts
of chemicals in this manner is rare in the industrial situation. See Carcinogen
Standard, supra note 10, at 5109-10; Stokinger, Routes of Entry and Modes of
Action, in OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES, supra note 19, at 11.
23. Notable exceptions to this rule are those reagents that have specific
affinities for certain molecules, for example, the well-known action of organo-
phosphorous pesticides on the central nervous system. E. ARIiNs, A. SIMONIS
& J. OFFERMEIER, INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL TOXICOLOGY 184-88 (1976). Al-
though no known agents exist with this kind of specificity for gonadal tissues,
any such substances would likely affect both sexes similarly because of the
relative biochemical similarity of gonadal tissues.
[VOL. 26; p. 239
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a long-term sexually integrated workforce.2 4 The point here is that
exclusion of only women from agents that affect reproductive ca-
pacity will not solve the problem of toxic effects. Male as well as
female workers must be protected from these toxic agents either by
engineering controls, work practice controls, personal protective
equipment, or by removal from the workplace.25
Although current knowledge clearly shows that, from a toxi-
cological standpoint, women are not much more susceptible to work
related exposures than their male counterparts, 2 pregnancy changes
this rough equivalence. 27 In 1946, Anna Baetjer, in her classic
treatise, Women in Industry: Their Health and Efficiency,28 con-
cluded that normal women need no special restrictions but warned
24. An interesting study, for example, would be to ascertain whether
paraffin causes lesions in females comparable to the scrotal carcinomas observed
!n males. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES, supra note 19, at 131, 147-48. This example
is of increasing significance due to the paraffin content of petroleum and
especially shale oils.
25. In instances in which engineering technology cannot be applied to the
control of environmental hazards, personal protective equipment and devices
must be employed to shield workers from their effects. Since these devices are
usually designed and sized to fit the standard male frame, however, they may
not provide the desired protection for women. Poor fit can vitiate the pro-
tective effects of respirators and harnesses, while safety shoes and garments
that are too large precipitate accidents. Women may have to be temporarily
barred from tasks that require the use of personal protective equipment until
a vendor who can supply properly fitting items can be located. Warshaw,
Employee Health Services for Women Workers, 7 J. PREv. MED. 385, 387-88
(1978). See also Prieve, Job Placement of Women in the Lead Trades: A
Worker's Position, in WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE, supra note 3, at 251,
256-58.
26. See, e.g., Messite & Bond, Considerations for Women at Work, in
OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE-PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 32 (1979).
See also J. STELLMAN, WOMEN'S WORK, WOMEN'S HEALTH (1978) (the author
explores the biological effects of stress on working women, health hazards
faced by women in the workplace, and the relationship between reproduction
and work hazards).
27. A recent report outlined principles of preventing harm to the pregnant
worker and the fetus. See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLO-
GISTS, GUIDELINES ON PREGNANCY AND WORK (1978) (published in conjunction
with the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (DHEW Pub.
No. 78-1978)). The report began with the premise that "a normal woman,
with a normal pregnancy and normal fetus in a job presenting no greater
hazards than those encountered in the daily life of the community may con-
tinue to work without interruption until the onset of labor and may resume
working several weeks after an uncomplicated delivery." Id. at 3 (emphasis
added). Exposure to toxic substances, however, presents greater hazards than
those encountered in the daily life of the community. See Burwell v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474, 484 (E.D. Va. 1978), afjd in part and rev'd
in part, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3643 (1981).
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that pregnant women might be adversely affected by exposures to
toxic substances that would usually be safe. Some agents have
toxic effects only on the embryo or the fetus during gestation and
not on either the pregnant parent or the preconception viability of
the nonparent. Other hazards which the normal, nonpregnant
woman might tolerate with impunity will threaten the progress of
the pregnancy and the development of the fetus. For example, the
pregnant woman, her fetus, and the newborn infant are particu-
larly vulnerable to the effects of low concentrations of carbon
monoxide.
2 9
The preceding discussion is not to imply that sex-specific dif-
ferences in exposure to toxic substances do not exist, but they
appear to be quantitatively minor. They will assume importance
only if occupational safety and health standards are set extremely
low. If, for example, both sexes require personal protective equip-
ment at an exposure of 100 parts per million (ppm) 30 of substance
x, there may be both equal safety and equal treatment; but if the
maximum allowable exposure is lowered to 10 ppm, only one sex,
or the fetus, may still require protection. Thus one achieves a
marginal gain in safety at the cost of unequal treatment and sub-
stantial economic inefficiency. At 1 ppm, no one may require
protection and equal treatment is restored, but the cost may be
absolutely prohibitive in terms of production and efficiency. Thus
minor differences in exposure levels may cause serious legal con-
flicts that might not occur if the sex differences presented a clear-
cut choice.
B. Differential Carcinogenicity
The 1979 edition of the Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical
Substances published by the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health includes toxicological information on 39,221
different compounds. 31 Not all toxic substances listed exhibit car-
29. Id. at 268.
30. A part per million (ppm) is one part of x in 999,999 parts of y on a
weight/weight basis. Using metric units, one ppm is one milligram per
1,000,000 milligrams or, more simply, one ppm is equal to one milligram per
kilogram. A part per billion (ppb), which is one part in 1,000,000,000 parts or
1 mg/I,000,00 0 g, is clearly an even smaller number, but it still means roughly
100 million trillion molecules of the carcinogen per liter of water or air.
31. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REGISTRY OF Toxic EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL
SUBSTANCES (1979). See also Slesin & Sandier, Characterization of Chemicals
Upder the Toxic Substances Control Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 859, 361 (1978).
[VOL. 26: p. 239
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cinogenic 32 potential to animal or human populations.3 8 In fact
most toxic substances do not cause cancer.
84
Cancer is a disease, in all probability of DNA, generally irre-
versible and autonomous in its natural course of development, and
characterized in its advanced stages by the progressive growth of
abnormal (immature) populations of cells.35 The early cellular
events of the disease and the causative factors leading to initiation
of the disease are poorly understood, but cancer apparently origi-
nates from cells that have been transformed by changes in or dam-
age to genetic material.3 6 The characteristic toxicologic event in
32. Very simply put, the term carcinogenic means any substance which
may produce cancer in humans or animals. Carcinogen Standard, supra note
10, at 5004, 5022-27. There are various definitions of a carcinogen set forth
in the Carcinogen Standard, but the best and broadest definition is "an agent,
process or habit that increases the risk of cancer among people of a particular
age." Id. at 5022. Unfortunately, the definition of toxic substance and poten.
tial occupational carcinogen have been amalgamated into a single definition
in the standard. Id. (codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1990.103 (1980)). According to
OSHA, four distinctive features of carcinogenesis set it off from other types of
toxicity and require it to be treated differently from a regulatory viewpoint:
(1) cancers develop from a single transformed cell; (2) the irreversibility of
carcinogenic effects; (3) most cancers are age-dependent; and (4) there is a
long latent period between exposure and effect. Id. at 5022-27. See also
INTERAGENCY REGULATORY LIAISON GROUP, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &
WELFARE, REGULATION OF CHEMICAL CARCINOGENS 6 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as IRLG REPORT]; Regulatory Council Statement of Government Policy for
Regulation of Chemical Carcinogens, [1979] Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REP.
(BNA) 443 [hereinafter cited as Regulatory Council Statement].
33. Carcinogen Standard, supra note 10, at 5028-29; IRLG REPORT, supra
note 32, at 4; Work Group on Risk Assessment, Scientific Bases for Identifica-
'tion of Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks, 63 J. NAT'L CANCER
INST. 241, 245 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Scientific Bases].
34. IRLG REPORT, supra note 32, at 9; Regulatory Council Statement,
supra note 32, at 443; Scientific Bases, supra note 33, at 246.
35. Carcinogen Standard, supra note 10, at 5016-17. According to OSHA,
cancer accounted for more than 18% of deaths in the United States in 1975.
Id. at 5015. Almost 400,000 Americans died of cancer in 1977, over one mil-
lion are under treatment of the disease, and about 25% of the population
ultimately will develop some form of cancer. Id. At the heart of the carcino-
gen standard is the classification of toxic substances into several categories
based on the conclusiveness of data on their carcinogenicity. See 29 C.F.R.
1990.112(a) (1980). Based upon this classification, carcinogenic toxic sub-
stances will be reviewed and regulated in different ways on the basis of human
epidemiological studies or experimental carcinogenesis bioassays in mammals.
Id. at 1990.141-.147. The standard provides for future individual rulemakings
for substances, combinations or mixtures thereof, or processes, and for selection
of the most effective type of regulation to control human exposures thereto.
Id.
36, Carcinogen Standard, supra note 10, at 5016. Scientific evidence indi-
cates that cancers start from single cells, and some scientists believe that a single
molecule may be enough to start a cancer. See Cornfield, Carcinogenic Risk
Assessment, 198 SCIENCE 693, 696 (1977); Crump, Hoel, Langley & Petro,
Fundamental Carcinogenic Processes and Their Implications for Low Dose
Risk Assessment, 36 CANCER RESEARCH 2973, 2977 (1976).
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carcinogenesis is a change in the regulatory mechanism of the tar-
get cells resulting in self-replicating target lesions, that is, modify-
ing the genome or other molecular control mechanisms in the
target cells that then can give rise to a progeny of permanently
allied cells.87 Once the initial carcinogenic event has been trig-
gered, the resulting aberrant cells invade normal tissue and spread
through the body, even though the agent responsible for inducing
the disease may no longer be present.8 8
Cancer has several significant and distinguishing characteris-
tics. One is that the carcinogenic process differs from other types
of toxic effects in its irreversibility and individuals exposed to a
carcinogen generally remain at increased risk of developing cancer
even after exposure has ceased. 9 Another important character-
istic is that, contrary to popular thought, cancer is not organ or
species specific.40  Finally, cancer is multi-stage and multi-causal.
41
The most prominent causes of cancer are believed to be genetic
and environmental factors with perhaps sixty to ninety percent of
all cancers related to environmental factors.42  While those states
37. Scientific Bases, supra note 33, at 245.
38. Carcinogen Standard, supra note 10, at 5016.
39. Id. at 5024-26. For this reason, OSHA recommends no threshold level
of exposure in carcinogen standards. Id. at 5137. OSHA concluded that"even if [thresholds exist], there is no scientific way to establish what they are
for any specific carcinogen and for any specific population." Id.
40. Id. at 5094-96. This means that "a positive result in one organ of
one species would . . . be indicative of a potential risk to exposed humans
regardless of the organ or site at risk in humans." Id. at 5094.
41. Id. at 5017-22. OSHA stated that
cancer is a complex disease that characteristically progresses through a
number of stages of development, and that a variety of different factors
can act to initiate or accelerate its development at each stage. It fol-
lows from this proposition that most cancers would have multiple
"causes" and that it therefore would be simplistic to assign to each a
single causative agent.
Id. at 5017. The development of cancer requires a latent period during which
it may take from five to forty years before the disease progresses to the point
where detection is possible. Id. at 5026. Prior to or during the developmental
period, the effects of continuous or occasional exposure to different carcinogenic
agents may be either additive or synergistic. Id. at 5020-21. For a discussion
of these terms, see note 50 infra.
42. See Carcinogen Standard, supra note 10, at 5027-28; Weisburger, En-
vironmental Cancer, 18 J. Occ. MED. 245, 252 (1976). This means, according
to OSHA, that "occupational cancers may be preventable if the causative agents
can be identified and human exposure to them eliminated or minimized."
Carcinogen Standard, supra note 10, at 5028. One source has alleged that such
an inference is "demonstrably wrong," since the most ubiquitous, prevalent,
and significant cancer-causing factors are not industrial chemicals, but rather
factors associated with the ordinary process of living, such as smoking, diet, and
exposure to solar radiation. AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL HEALTH COUNCIL, RECOM.
MENDED ALTERNATIVES TO OSHA's GENERIC CARCINOGEN PROPOSAL 32-39 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as AIHC].
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with the highest cancer rates are the more densely populated, ur-
banized, and industrialized, 48 "[t]his excess disease risk may be
related to life style (urban dwellers use more tobacco, for example),
to occupation (working with toxic substances), to the environment
of cities (air pollution and water pollution), or to other factors as
yet unidentified, as well as combinations thereof.44 The incidence
of cancer attributable to industrial or occupational use of toxic sub-
stances cannot be estimated with any precision.45 But OSHA, in its
generic carcinogen policy, asserts that occupational cancers may be
preventable if the causative agents can be identified, their carcino-
genicity determined, and hazardous human exposure to them elimi-
nated or minimized.46
Differential carcinogenicity is a more common observation than
differential toxicity, but because of the apparent variability in in-
dividual susceptibility, it is harder to explain. Individual response
to carcinogens can vary greatly.47 Age, sex, race, genetics, hormone
status, life style, and diet all affect the varying individual suscepti-
bility to a chemical carcinogen. 4 Some cases of differential car-
cinogenicity involve merely different or less virulent cancers at
similar carcinogen levels. For example, N-nitrosodimethylamine,
an industrial solvent used in the manufacture of rocket fuels, causes
hepatomas and kidney tumors in both sexes of hamsters; however,
males are more prone to liver cancer, whereas females are more
prone to kidney cancer. The recently issued final standard for
occupational exposure to lead echoes the fact that differential car-
cinogenicity means merely different types of cancers:
Exposure to lead results in decreased libido, impotence
and sterility in men and decreased fertility, abnormal men-
strual and ovarian cycles in women. The course of preg-
nancy is adversely affected by exposure to lead. There is
43. Identification, Classification and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing
a Potential Occupational Carcinogenic Risk, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,150 (1977).
44. Id. Among other factors that influence cancer incidence are trauma,
burns, diet, caloric intake, viruses, and hormones. Carcinogen Standard, supra
note 10, at 5020.
45. The best estimate is that industrial chemicals have accounted for one
to five percent of all cancers. See Carcinogen Standard, supra note 10, at
5030-31.
46. Id. at 5004
47. Id. at 5020-27. Since carcinogenesis results from the interaction of a
toxic material with a biological target, the effect is qualified by the susceptibility
-of various cell types, tissues or organs, and individuals. Id.
48. Id. at 5026; Conibear, supra note 12, at 171; Scientific Bases, supra
note 33, at 247-49. Frequently the carcinogenic response to a chemical insult
will be limited to a particular segment of the exposed population, for example,
,sex-specific or single sex.
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conclusive evidence of miscarriage and stillbirth in women
who were exposed to lead or whose husbands were ex-
posed. Children born of parents either of whom were
exposed to lead are more likely to have birth defects,
mental retardation, behavioral disorders or die during the
first year of childhood.49
Apparently, differential carcinogenisis also may be caused by dif-
ferent personal habits, especially smoking. Because males, in par-
ticular blue collar males, statistically smoke more than females,
they are more sensitive to those agents which cause lung cancer,
all other things, including other cancers, remaining equal.
5 0 Con-
comitantly, women's risk of occupational disease would decrease.
49. OSHA Final Standard for Occupational Exposure to Lead, 43 Fed. Reg.
52,952, 52,954 (1978) (codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1979)) (hereinafter cited as
Lead Standard]. The Consolidated Brief for United Steelworkers filed in the
lead standard case, United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 8 OSHC 1810 (D.C. Cir.
1980), however, casts doubt on the carcinogenic properties of lead:
OSHA's conclusions concerning the hazards to the reproductive
capacity of male workers are based on a single study of Rumanian
workers by Iona Lancranjan. Even apart from the unreliability of
Lancranjan's raw data (which she claimed were Rumanian state secrets
and could not be examined), her study did not show at what blood.
lead levels an effect on sperm count and motility occurs. Nor did it
show whether the observed effects affected fertility other than in a
group of lead poisoned workers with blood-lead level concentrations
ranging far above levels permitted by current industrial practices. In-
deed, Lancranjan's study was so materially flawed that the Chairman
of the recent International Amsterdam Conference of Industrial Hy-
gienists warned that standards for occupational lead exposure cannot
be based upon the effects described in Lancranjan's study.
Brief for Petitioners at 63, United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 8 OSHC 1810
(D.C. Cir. 1980). Another commentator, Dr. Jeanne Stellman of the Women's
Occupational Health Resource Center at Columbia University, doubts that lead
has transplacental effects, for there is not one clear-cut experiment establishing
lead as a teratogen. Severo, supra note 3, § 1, at 36, col. 6.
50. Carcinogen Standard, supra note 10, at 5020-34. OSHA's position is
that regulation of cigarette smoking, even though smoking is a major cause of
cancer, would go beyond the purview of the Act. Id. at 5033. The American
Cancer Society estimates that smoking cigarettes may account for as much as
80% of lung cancers, the leading cause of cancer deaths in males in the United
States. American Cancer Society, Lung Cancer-Cigarette Smoking Causes at
Least 80% of Lung Cancer, in CANCER FACTS AND FIGURES 5 (1977). See also
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
SMOKING AND HEALTH (1979). The 1979 Report of the Surgeon General found
that the risk of developing lung cancer increased with age, was higher in whites
than non-whites, and bore a dose-response relationship to cigarette smoking.
The report also stated that there is interaction between smoking and occupa-
tional exposures which increases the risks to workers, that is, tobacco products
may serve as vectors by becoming contaminated with toxic agents foun in the
workplace. This facilitates entry of the chemical agent by inhalation, ingestion,
or skin absorption. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &
WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 7-5 (1979).
Smoking can cause a variety of other harmful effects. Smoking may trans-
form workplace chemicals into more harmful agents, such as those which caused
[VOL. 26: p. 239
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In sum, there seems to be little evidence of any significant
difference between the sexes with respect to a carcinogenic response
,to chemical exposure. The empirical data, however, is in general
so scanty, especially for women - knowledge of health hazards
is principally derived from experience with men - that it is im-
possible to be certain.
C. Embryofetotoxic and Teratogenic Agents
Embryofetotoxic or teratogenic agents 5' are those agents that
,cross the placenta (transplacental) and are toxic to embryos, almost
always at concentrations that would have no effect on the male or
female adult.52  The question, therefore, is not whether the female
outbreaks of polymer fume fever in workers exposed to polytetrafluroethylene.
Certain toxic agents in the workplace also may occur in tobacco products or
-cigarette smoke, resulting in increased exposure to an agent. Finally, smoking
may cause an additive biological effect by contributing to an effect comparable
to that which can result from exposure to toxic agents found in the workplace,
such as the additive effects of smoking and exposure to coal, cotton dust, beta
radiation, chlorine, and exposures among firefighters. A synergistic effect (an
interaction in which the total effect of two chemicals may be greater than the
sum of the effects of the individual chemicals) much more profound than that
anticipated from the separate influences of the toxic agent and smoking may
be caused when smoking acts in conjunction with toxic agents. An example
of a synergistic interaction is benzo(a)pyrene and benzo(a)anthracene, which
are carcinogenic on mouse skin but whose potency is increased a thousandfold
in the presence of n-dodecane, which is noncarcinogenic by itself. See Carcino-
gen Standard, supra note 10, at 5020-21.
51. An embryofetotoxin is defined as a chemical that manifests an effect
upon the conceptus from the point of fertilization until birth. This definition,
which does not include in-utero-induced carcinogenicity and mutagenic-induced
abnormalities, is consistent with the EPA's definition of a teratogen set forth in
40 C.F.R. § 162.3 (mm) (1980). Such toxins may induce death, anatomical mal-
formations, metabolic or physiological dysfunction, or behavioral alteration
either at birth or in the postnatal periods.
52. Rice, An Overview of Transplacental Carcinogens, 8 TERATOLOGY 113
(1973). Exceptions, however, do exist. During pregnancy, the concentration
of red cells in the blood (and, therefore, hemoglobin) falls because of the in-
crease of plasma. This is commonly referred to as physiological anemia of
pregnancy. If there is an exposure to benzene or lead during this time, the
problem is compounded because both of these chemicals affect the blood form-
ing mechanism. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 8 HEALTH,
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT-SoME RESEARCH NEEDS 315-29 (1977); National Academy of Sciences,
Environmental Chemicals as Potential Hazards to Reproduction, in PRINCIPLES
FOR EVALUATING CHEMICALS 156 (1975).
This toxic differentiation is not limited to fetuses. Certain agents are also
more toxic to children than to adults. The hazards to the children are greater
because their bodies are developing and are more susceptible to health effects.
A 1977 amendment to the Child Labor Laws permits, upon waiver by the
Secretary of Labor, ten- and eleven-year-old children to work on farms picking
crops. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976), as amended
by Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151, 91 Stat.
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employee is more susceptible, or is at a greater risk of adverse
health effects from preconception exposure, than the male em-
ployee. The problem is rather the in-utero exposure of the fetus.
during gestation and the female is involved only because she is
uniquely capable of bearing children. Protection or removal of
the female from exposure to such agents should not be character-
ized, then, as an issue of discrimination against the female em-
ployee because she is female. The problems related to the right
of women to continue working until term and the recent amend-
ment to Title VII which regards pregnancy as a disability 58 are
overshadowed by the dilemmas inherent in attempting to protect
unborn children from exposure to toxic substances in the work-
place.
The potential of some chemical substances to cause damage to
a developing embryo has long been recognized. For example,
lead served as an abortifacient many years ago. 54  In the early
1900's, the decreased fertility and increased abortion rate of women
in the lead pottery industry led to the widespread enactment of
labor codes forbidding the employment of women in industries
where lead was a hazard.
55
1245, 1250-51 (1977). These crops may be sprayed with pesticides which are
known to cause cancer, birth defects, and genetic mutations. Both OSHA and
EPA have warned that there are no criteria which can be used to establish
tolerance limits for working children. Epidemiological information on the
effects of toxic agents on children in prepubertal ages is nonexistent. [1978]
Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1123. Recently two United States Courts
of Appeals ruled that the Secretary of Labor cannot waive regulations prohibit-
ing the use of 10- and I l-year-olds to harvest agricultural crops until objective
data is developed providing absolute proof that pesticide exposure will not re-
sult in adverse health effects. See National Ass'n of Farmworkers Organizations
v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Washington State Farm Bureau v.
Marshall, 625 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1980). The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit also determined that the appropriate notice-
and-comment rulemaking had not taken place regarding the regulation pro-
hibiting employment of 10- and 11-year-olds and enjoined further waiver under
the regulation until there had been compliance with the proper procedure.
National Ass'n of Farmworkers Organizations v. Marshall, 628 F.2d at 622-23.
For a discussion of the rulemaking procedure, see notes 113-15 and accompany-
ing text infra. In response, the Department of Labor reassessed and republished
a final rule. See 45 Fed. Reg. 55,175 (1980). That rule requires the party
seeking a waiver either to state that no pesticides or other chemicals will be
used or to submit data from which the Secretary can determine that there is no
danger to the children involved. Id. at 55,177. At present, this apparently is
an impossible burden since none of the comments submitted in response to the
proposed rule was able to demonstrate absolute safety. Id.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1979). See notes 273-309 and ac-
companying text infra.
54. Lead Standard, supra note 49, at 54,388.
55. WoMEN AND THE WOR"LACE, supra note 3, at 246.
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Perhaps the most dramatic incident involved the ingestion of
Thalidomide, a tranquilizer used in Europe for several years. 56 The
drug caused tragic malformations in children delivered by women
who had taken it during their pregnancy. A new class of physical
and chemical agents, which might be termed embryocarcinogens,
are only now being discovered. These agents create cancers in the
fetus, which can manifest their effects as late as twenty years after
birth.57
One cannot overstate the sensitivity of the developing human
embryo in utero, particularly during the first trimester of preg-
nancy. While there is little gain in size during this time, an in-
credibly intricate series of biochemical events occurs, involving both
rapid cell division and differentiation."8 These processes are highly
interdependent. If one step is delayed, even slightly, relative to
others, the result can be a drastic change in the overall develop-
mental pattern. Agents may have a pronounced effect on the in-
fant during organogenesis (formation of organs), as was the case with
Thalidomide. Because development is from relatively undifferen-
tiated cells to a large number of specialized types, the earlier the
embryo is exposed to a toxin, the more serious the result. Further-
more, differentiation begins within a few days of conception, so
that irreversible damage can occur long before pregnancy is clini-
cally detectable.59 Because most toxic molecules are able to pass
from the mother's blood to the embryo by simple diffusion, there
is a potential for fetal damage if the mother is exposed to toxic
56. Another disturbing example is Minamata disease, a nuerological dis-
order detected in Japan in 1956. See Smith, Congenital Minamata Disease:
Methyl-Mercury Poisoning and Birth Defects in Japan, in WOMEN AND THE
WORKPLACE, supra note 10, at 75-76. The disease developed because mercury
was dumped into a river that emptied into Minamata Bay, where finfish and
shellfish were harvested and subsequently ingested. Investigations determined
that if a woman's methyl-mercury intake was great enough, she would become
acutely ill and unable to conceive. If she ingested less of the compound, she
could become pregnant but the child would be born dead or would be aborted
spontaneously. Finally, if a still smaller dose was ingested, a child would be
born with the characteristic symptoms of neurological damage due to mercury.
See generally P. D'ITai & F. D'ITRI, MERCURY CONTAMINATION: A HUMAN
TRAGEDY (1977).
57. Agents that are apparently nontoxic to the fetus in utero because
they have been detoxified by the mother may nevertheless be toxic to the new-
born infant if it is born with the agent in its body tissues. The infant may
not have the enzyme system or complex metabolic mechanism to detoxify it.
58. Differentiation is the process whereby a cell becomes characteristically
a specific kind, for example, a muscle cell.
59. The latency period between exposure to a carcinogen and the onset
of cancer is often shortened by transplacental exposure. McLachlan, Male as
well as Female are Affected by In Utero Exposure to Diethylstilbestrol, in
WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE, supra note 10, at 32.
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materials through ingestion, skin absorption, or inhalation. In
addition, since the embryo's organ systems are not developed, they
lack the compensatory and homeostatic mechanisms that can con-
trol or negate toxicity in adults. Thus, not only is the embryo
affected more drastically, it is also sensitive at much lower levels.
The list of embryotoxic agents is endless, but recognition of
the number of sources involved still may understate the scope of the
problem. Even sub-critical exposures to toxic agents may decrease
the developmental potential of the child, for example, by lowering
intelligence and decreasing overall health. The problem is further
complicated by the fact that identification of the worker contem-
plating parenthood is beyond the scope of current regulatory com-
petence. In addition, there is no reliable method of ascertaining
human pregnancy prior to three weeks after conception, and many
women are pregnant for four to six weeks before they know it.6O
Thus, the awareness of pregnancy (or fatherhood) often does not
occur until after a critical ontogenic period during which injury
of an irreversible nature may occur. This is important when one
considers the mutagenic activity of certain substances, which occurs
before conception, as opposed to developmental embryofetotoxic
effects that occur later in pregnancy. The simplistic approach of
protecting the fetus by removing the woman from the workplace
after confirmation of pregnancy is not the answer. A woman will
not and cannot know that she is pregnant early enough to prevent
fetal damage. Action must be taken prior to that time.
Even if very early pregnancy detection were possible, the prob-
lem presented by the fertile woman in the workplace would not
be resolved. The body deals with cumulative toxins by storing
them in various metabolically inert locations such as bone (lead)
or fat (DDT), whereupon they are slowly released at levels man-
ageable to the adult organism. Unfortunately, this means that ex-
posure of potential parents weeks or even years prior to conception
can do significant damage to the toxically sensitive embryo.6'
III. THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENTIATION:
A SOLOMON'S SOLUTION?
In a recent series of policy pronouncements, OSHA has ex-
pressed grave concerns about the workplace exclusion of women
60. Krause, Pregnant Women in the Workplace, A Company Program to
Control Toxic Exposures, NAT'L SAu'rry NEws 52 (Feb. 1979); Panel Discus.
sion, in WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE, supra note 3, at 327, 332.
61. See text at pages 315-16 infra.
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exposed to toxic hazards. The concerns, however, are not addressed
to the health and safety of female workers, but rather to the prob-
lem of discrimination which may result from the exclusion.6 2 In
a letter sent in the spring of 1978 to approximately four hundred
company doctors, Eula Bingham, then Assistant Secretary of Labor
for Occupational Safety and Health, suggested that employers should
make the workplace safe by reducing or eliminating dangerous ex-
posures to toxic substances, not by excluding certain workers.0 3
At an AFL-CIO workshop in the fall of 1978, Robert Jennings, of
OSHA's policy office, encouraged women who have been told that
they must change jobs because they are of childbearing age to file
discrimination complaints with OSHA, the EEOC, and the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP).04.
OSHA's anti-discrimination policy culminated in the issuance
of a citation and proposed $10,000 penalty against American Cyana-
mid Company.6 The company allegedly developed a policy of
requiring female employees to be sterilized in order to continue
working in areas of its Willow Island, West Virginia chemical plant
where the women would be exposed to certain toxic substances,
principally lead.66 OSHA asserted that this policy constituted a
willful violation of section 5 (a) (1) of the Act,0 7 which requires em-
ployers to provide employment free from recognized hazards likely
62. Problems with respect to the failure or refusal to hire persons identi-
fied as "hypersusceptible" also may be evidenced, for when genetic screening
is utilized in pre-employment testing, it has the potential for becoming a dis-
criminatory tool. Severo, supra note 3, § 1, at 1, cols. 1-2 and § 1, at 36, cols.
1-2. Severo stated that:
[T]here is mystery about the Federal Government's role. A regula-
tion, well known to industry, exists in rules promulgated by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. To industry, the
regulation is a mandate for genetic screening, but key people in
OSHA were either unaware of its existence or unable to explain it.
Id. § 1, at 36, col. 1. The regulation in question prescribed the medical sur-
veillance requirements of the 1974 Carcinogen Standard, 29 C.F.R. 1910.1004
(g)(1)(i) (1980). OSHA later stated that the regulation was not intended
to be used to exclude the hypersusceptible from employment, even though
the regulation recognizes that there are persons identified as being more prone
to development of cancer due to genetic factors. [1980] Occ. SAFETY &
HEALTH REP. (BNA) 859. See also OSHA Instruction STD 1-23.4 (Aug. 22,
1980) (workplace health standards which mention genetic factors in review of
employee medical histories do not require genetic testing).
63. 11978] Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1703.
64. Id. at 519.
65. Secretary of Labor v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 79-5762 (O.S.H.R.C.,
filed Oct. 25, 1979).
66. Id.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976).
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to cause death or serious physical harm.68 According to OSHA, the
company's policy, which became effective in October 1978, resulted
in five female employees undergoing sterilization to retain their
jobs in lead exposure areas.
The problem, however, is not just exposure of the female
workers, but possible fetal toxicity caused by the blood lead levels
that the women tolerate. This compounds the problem, because
many standards, and in particular the lead standard, do not ade-
quately protect the fetus. The final lead standard established a
permissible exposure limit (PEL) of 50 1 g/m 3 averaged over an
eight-hour period, the lowest level for which there is evidence of
feasibility.6 9 OSHA stated that compliance with the standard would
ensure equal employment for both men and women.70 In truth it
will ensure only equal carcinogenic exposure. In order to provide
necessary protection against the effects of lead exposure, the blood
lead level of workers in the lead industry must be set below
40 pg/lOOg. 71 Although the standard's 50 ag/m PEL may improve
industrial conditions and provide some protection for workers who
do not plan to become parents, this standard will not achieve the
goal of maintaining the blood lead levels in all occupationally ex-
posed workers below 40 pg/lOOg.
72
Moreover, OSHA stated that the blood lead level of men and
women who plan pregnancies should be maintained at less than
68. Secretary of Labor v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 79-5762 (O.S.H.R.C.,
filed Oct. 25, 1979).
On September 11, 1980, OSHA charged in a similar citation that Bunker
Hill Company of Kellog, Idaho willfully adopted and administered a corporate
policy requiring women employees to undergo sterilization in order to be
eligible to work in areas of the plant where they would be exposed to lead.
The Company responded that although it has a written policy that it will not
employ women capable of bearing children in areas where they would be
exposed to lead, that policy does not mention sterilization. [1980] Occ.
SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 397. Documents from OSHA and the EEOC
reportedly reveal that complaints are pending against several other companies
including Allied Chemical, B.F. Goodrich, and General Motors. Severo, supra
note 3, § 1, at 36, col. 5. These complaints could be affected by the recent
decision of an administrative law judge vacating the willful violation of § 5(a)(l)
of the Act by American Cyanamid Co. On April 27, 1981, after an expedited
review before the three-member Commission, the vacation of the citation was
upheld by the Commission on the basis that the citation failed to allege a vio-
lation cognizable under the general duty clause of the Act. [1981] DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 84.
69. Lead Standard, supra note 49, at 52,963.
70. Id. at 52,966.
71. Id. at 52,963.
72. Id. OSHA predicted that "29.3 percent of exposed lead workers will
have [blood lead levels] about 40 ug/100g at any one time when uniform com-
pliance with 50 ug/ms PEL is achieved." Id.
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30 ug/100g during this period.73  The lower level is also necessary
to protect the fetus, which is particularly susceptible to neurologi-
cal damage in any level above 30 Ug/l00g. 74 As stated in the
standard, "[t]here is conclusive evidence that lead crosses the
placenta of pregnant women and enters the fetal tissues." 75 OSHA
specifically recognizes that the standard of 50 ug/m 3 PEL will not
protect either the fetus or the worker planning a pregnancy. 7
The only way in which the standard proposes to protect these two
categories of susceptible persons is to establish a 30 pg/ OOg action
level and possibly to remove workers who wish to plan pregnancies
or who are pregnant when exposures reach that level. 7  By sug-
gesting removal,78 OSHA specifically recognizes that the lead stand-
ard cannot feasibly protect either fetuses or workers who plan
pregnancies.
More importantly, the standard provides and confirms that par-
ticular classes of employees are more susceptible than others and
require a higher level of protection against a toxic substance than
do the rest of the workforce. In an anomoly, however, OSHA states
in the standard that there is "no basis whatsoever for the claim that
women of childbearing age should be excluded from the workplace
in order to protect the fetus or the course of pregnancy." 19 Apart
from dealing with the problem of inconsistencies within OSHA
concerning the removal of workers from the workplace, employers
73. Id.
74. Id. at 52,966. The Center for Disease Control, the Toxicology Com-
mittee of the National Academy of Sciences, and the EPA recommend that
blood lead levels of children also be kept below 30 pg/100g. Id. OSHA
recognizes that blood lead levels of persons planning pregnancies or pregnant
women should be maintained below 30 pg/100g. Id. at 52,960. Certainly
the fetus and newborn should be similarly protected. Id. at 52,966. When
compliance with the standard is achieved, the mean blood lead level for a
population of lead workers will uniformly be 35 ug/100g. Id. At this level
neither reproduction nor the fetus will be protected.
75. Id. at 52,965.
76. Id. at 52,966.
77. Id.
78. Id. In the preamble to the lead standard, OSHA states that con-
sidering groups of individuals who may exhibit a greater susceptibility is ap-
propriate. Id.
79. Id. A lack of knowledge about reproductive toxicology has resulted
in an emphasis on workplace exposures of women, but such an emphasis fails
to recognize the effects of paternal exposure. Prohibition of the exclusion of
women does not recognize that males are at risk from exposure and that male
exposures can result in defective sperm, which may lead to birth defects. The
major problem facing both industry and regulatory agencies is limited knowl-
edge about reproductive hazards, in particular what levels of exposure may
cause harm to a developing fetus, even if the mother and father are safe.
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who do not remove susceptible employees from exposure also face
conflicts with the discrimination laws.
In an attempt to resolve the problem of fair and equitable
treatment of the employment rights of women when there is ex-
posure to hazardous substances, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and the Office of Federal Contract Compli-
ance Programs (OFCCP) issued draft interpretive guidelines.80
The guidelines were premised on the assumption that laws pro-
hibiting discrimination in employment are consistent with those
laws designed to assure a workplace free of conditions that threaten
the health or safety of employees.8'
The proposed guidelines stated that some employers have
adopted policies of either not hiring women of childbearing ca-
pacity for jobs in which there is exposure to alleged reproductive
hazards or terminating or transferring women to lower paying jobs.82
In the opinion of the EEOC and OFCCP, these policies have been
developed without apparent regard to whether exposure of the
father can also result in harm to the unborn child.8  Title VII
and Executive Order No. 11,246,84 according to the guidelines,
require that enforcement agencies closely scrutinize the exclusion
of a sex-based class from consideration for employment.8 5 Such
exclusions are per se violations of Title VII, because "the exclu-
sions are expressed or implemented in terms of membership in a
class protected by Title VII." 8I The guidelines pointed out that
as a result of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,8 7 women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions constitute a
protected class and for employment-related purposes must be
treated the same as other persons not so affected.88
80. Interpretive Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproduc-
tive Hazards, 45 Fed. Reg. 7514 (1980). OSHA did not join in the issuance
of the draft guidelines; its basic role was defined as one of "consultation and
coordination." Id. The EEOC and OFCCP "especially" noted that the pro-
posed guidelines do not attempt to implement or enforce OSHA policies related
to health and safety. Id. The task of assuring a workplace free of conditions
that threaten the health or safety of employees remains with OSHA. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 7514-15.
83. Id. at 7515.
84. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), re-
printed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
85. 45 Fed. Reg. 7515 (1980).
86. Id.
87. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2067 (1978).
88. 45 Fed. Reg. 7515 (1980).
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Employers could establish neutral policies under the guidelines
to protect all employees from workplace hazards.89 If such poli-
cies had an adverse impact on one sex, however, they would have
to be justified in accordance with relevant legal principles.9 0 Thus,
when an employer seeks to determine hazardous reproductive ef-
fects from exposure to a certain substance or condition, he must
determine the effects on males and nonpregnant females, as well as
pregnant women, from that exposure.9' If the hazard is known to
affect the fetus through either parent, the excluded class cannot be
limited to women alone, and, if the hazard is known to affect the
fetus through women only, the excluded class must be limited to
pregnant women, not to all women of childbearing capacity.92
The EEOC and the OFCCP recognized that there may be situ-
ations where an employer has scientific evidence of reproductive
harm to only one sex-based class and no evidence regarding the
other sex-based class.03 Under those circumstances, the guidelines
would have permitted a "temporary emergency exclusion" policy
protecting the endangered sex-based class, provided that the policy
was "(a) narrowly tailored to those individuals to whom harm is.
indicated, (b) reflect[ed] consideration and adoption of suitable
alternatives, and (c) provide[d] for timely completion of research on
89. Id.
90. Id. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
In determining whether an employer's conduct is nondiscriminatory, the
draft guidelines state that the following factors are among those which may be
considered: (1) whether the reproductive policy is applied consistently to em-
ployees and applicants of both sexes, and to all recognized reproductive hazards
in the workplace; (2) whether information obtained from the OSHA or other
governmental authorities shows that the employer has not complied with ap-
plicable occupational safety and health laws; (3) whether the employer has
investigated the effects of all recognized reproductive hazards present in the
workplace on those classes adversely affected by the policy and those not ad-
versely affected; (4) whether the employer had excluded the adversely affected
sex from the same employment opportunities prior to the adoption of the
policy; (5) whether the hazard is significantly greater for or confined to the
class excluded than for the class not excluded; (6) whether the class adversely
affected by the policy is narrowly tailored to the type of hazard posed; (7)
whether the hazard poses a significant health risk to body systems other than
the reproductive system for the class not excluded; (8) whether the employer
has investigated alternatives to the exclusion of adversely affected employees
from the workplace and adopted the alternative means where feasible; and
(9) whether the employer is monitoring scientific research and technological
evelopments which may affect the appropriateness of its policy. 45 Fed. Reg-
7516-17 (1980).
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the other sex-based class." 94 Finally, an employer was permitted
to temporarily remove employees of both sexes from work areas
containing reproductive hazards, if such employees declared an
intention to parent children and voluntarily requested such exclu-
sionsY5
The guidelines seem to be a step in the right direction, for the
EEOC and the OFCCP apparently are concerned about the repro-
ductive health of parents and the effects of exposure to toxic sub-
stances on the fetus. The guidelines also seem to recognize that
there may be situations justifying exclusion of certain classes of
persons from the workplace. OSHA and at least one employee
union, however, criticized the draft interpretive guidelines, con-
sidering them to be a real setback.9 6 Partially as a result of this
criticism and OSHA's failure to join in their issuance, the proposed
guidelines were withdrawn.97 The agencies involved concluded
that the most appropriate method of eliminating differentiation in
the workplace where there is potential exposure to reproductive
hazards is through investigation and enforcement of the law on a
case by case basis.
98
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has also ex-
pressed its concern with the health of the fetus and particularly
-with the exposure of fertile females to ferriamicide which contains
MICEX, a fetotoxic agent in a pesticide used against fire ants. 99
Invoking its authority under the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA),1°0 the EPA prohibited women of childbearing age from
using the pesticide under any circumstances. 1 1 The EPA stated
94. Id.
95. Id. at 7516.
96. [1980] Occ. SAFETY Sc HEALTH REP. (BNA) 804. OSHA stated that the
guidelines caused it great concern because of the temporary removal provisions
therein. Id. The Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union suggested that
the guidelines might result in workers being worse off than they are presently.
Id. For a summary of other comments on the proposed guidelines, see id. at
91-92.
97. 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 (1981).
98. Id.
99. See [1979] Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1481. See also 44 Fed.
Reg. 66,616 (1979). Proposed rules issued by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion recognize that the pregnant woman, human embryo, and fetus are par-
ticularly susceptible to a variety of chemicals, drugs, viruses, and other physical
agents, and therefore propose recommendations to reduce and minimize the
radiation of the human embryo and fetus from diagnostic X-ray procedures.
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
101. [1979] OcC. SAFETY &c HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1481.
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that although it did not favor actions that might result in limiting
jobs available to women, the trade-off was essential.
10 2
TSCA has only recently come into full operation, and its full
impact on this area has yet to be realized. Nevertheless, TSCA
appears to clearly expand existing federal authority to regulate the
chemical industry by granting the EPA authority to compel testing
of chemicals and to regulate their production, use, and disposal.
10 3
The House Report in support of TSCA states that "the overriding
purpose of the bill is to provide protection of health and the en-
vironment through authorities which are designed to prevent
harm." 104 Congress's concern was generated by the "vast volume"
of chemicals that have become a "pervasive and enduring part of
our environment . . . [and] have, for the most part, been released
into the environment with little or no knowledge of their long-
term health or environmental effects." 105
Is it not OSHA's purpose, as it is TSCA's, to prevent harm,
or is it rather to regulate job security under the guise of an anti-
discrimination policy? 106 If the former is the case, should it take
102. Id. EPA Administrator Barbara Blum explained:
We share your concern about sex-based distinctions in regulatory
decisions. In some cases, however, such distinctions are justifiable. In
the case of ferriamicide, the decision to prohibit females of child-
bearing age was based on test data showing that mirex, the principal
ingredient in ferriamicide, caused adverse effects in the offspring of
treated animals. EPA toxicologists interpreted this data as indicating
that pregnant women who are exposed to ferriamicide may have ab-
normal children. In fact, we tried to find a way to provide protection
for pregnant women, which would not affect nonpregnant women's
employment. The obvious ways, such as not excluding those either
permanently or temporarily sterile, would result in impossible legal
and administrative problems. How, for example, would an employer
assure itself to avoid subsequent liability that the employee on birth
control pills had remembered to take them? Would the company
physician be required to subject women employees to routine pelvic
examinations, and if so, how often? I can't imagine that requirements
like that would not be considered an unacceptable invasion of personal
privacy. One might also permit women who would assert that they are
not pregnant to waive the prohibition by consent, since it is for their
protection. The consensual waiver would also insulate the employer
from liability for claims asserted by the employee. The rights of an
injured child, however, cannot and indeed should not be waived.
Id. at 1482.
103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603-2605 (1976).
104. H.R. REP. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976).
105. Id. at 3. TSCA provides an opportunity to depart from the traditional
modes of regulation by authorizing the control of substances according to cate-
gories of chemicals. Maugh, Chemicals: Llow Many are There?, 199 SCIENCE
162 (1978). Under § 8(b)(1) of TSCA, EPA must "compile, keep current, and
publish a list of each chemical substance which is manufactured or processed in
the United States." 15 U.S.C. § 2607(b)(1) (1976).
106. See Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 599
F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that OSHA may not regulate job security).
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precedence over Title VII's purpose of providing equal employ-
ment opportunity? 107 The next sections of the article will set out
the ramifications of this conflict.108
IV. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF DIFFERENTIATION FROM THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PERSPECTIVE
A. Duties of Employers and Employees
In 1970, Congress declared that its purpose in enacting OSHA
was "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in
the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve
107. Section 4(b)(1) of the Act provides that "[n]othing in this Act shall
apply to working conditions of employees with respect to which other Federal
agencies . . . exercise statutory authority to perscribe or enforce standards or
regulations affecting occupational safety or health." 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1) (1976)
(emphasis added). In order for the § 4(b)(1) exemption to apply, the other
federal agency with jurisdiction over the employer must not only have statutory
authority to adopt regulations affecting job safety and health, but must actually
exercise that authority. Predictably, the issue of what constitutes an actual"exercise of authority" by another federal agency over safety and health condi-
tions of employees has produced much litigation. A large number of federal
agencies have promulgated safety and health standards covering employees in
various industries and thus have come into conflict with OSHA. The most
frequent conflict is between OSHA and the Department of Transportation.
See, e.g., Marshall v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 574 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1978); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. OSHRC, 548 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 874 (1977). Other federal agencies also have come into conflict with
OSHA. See, e.g., Organized Migrants in Community Action, Inc. v. Brennan,
520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Environmental Protection Agency); Aluminum
Co. of America v. Morton, 3 OSHC 1624 (D.D.C. 1975) (Mining Enforcement
& Safety Administration, Dep't of Interior); Mangus Firearms, 3 OSHC 1214
(1975) (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Dep't of the Treasury);
Gearhart-Owen Indus., Inc., 2 OSHC 1568 (1975) (Dep't of Defense).
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission has set up a
three-part guideline to determine whether the exemption provided by § 4(b)(1)
of the Act is operative: the sister agency must have statutory authority to regu-
late the specific working condition (the environmental area where an employee
goes about his daily tasks); the sister agency must have actually exercised its
authority to prescribe and enforce safety and health standards; and the policy
or purpose of the enabling legislation of the sister agency must be to assure
safe and healthful working conditions for the benefit of employees. See Her-
mann Forwarding Co., 3 OSHC 1253, 1254 (1975).
If the other agency has not met the guidelines, then the § 4(b)(1) exemption
is not operative, and OSHA may exercise its authority. Some agencies spe-
cifically provide in their own regulations for deferral to OSHA because of its
primary authority to regulate safety and health conditions of employees. For
example, the Consumer Product Safety Commission is required to defer to
OSHA. See 43 Fed. Reg. 25,660 (1978).
108. One aspect of the conflict that is not within the scope of this article
is the potential cause of action that either the mother of a malformed or still-
born child, or the child itself, might have under relevant state law. Such an
action is maintainable in about half the states. See Note, Employmen't Rights
of Women in The Toxic Workplace, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1113, 1132 nn.79 & 80
(1977).
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our human resources." 109 In order to accomplish this objective,
Congress established dual employer responsibilities under the Act. 110
First, each employer covered by the Act is required to comply with
the specific occupational safety and health standards promulgated
and enforced thereunder by the Secretary of Labor."' The Act
defines the term "occupational safety and health standard" as "a
standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one
or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful em-
ployment and places of employment." 112
Once OSHA has developed plans to promulgate a standard, it
publishes its intentions in the Federal Register as a "Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking" or often as an earlier "Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking." 1- The notice includes the terms of the
rule and provides a specific time (at least thirty days from the date
of publication, but occasionally sixty days or more) for the public to
respond." 4 Interested parties who submit written arguments and
pertinent evidence may request a public hearing on the proposal
when none has been announced in the notice."15
In promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or
harmful physical agents, the Secretary of Labor is required under
the Act to "set the standard which most adequately assures, to the
extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard
dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life." Ile
The validity of any OSHA standard promulgated under the toxic
materials section of the Act is subject to pre-enforcement judicial
109. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
110. Id. § 654.
111. Id. §654(a)(2). These specific standards are intended to be the pri-
mary method of compliance with OSHA objectives. Enforcement is carried
out through inspections, citations, and penalties. See id. §§ 657-659.
112. Id. § 652(8).
113. Id. §655(b)(2).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 655(b)(3). OSHA must schedule such a hearing if requested,
and must publish in advance the time and place for the hearing. Id. OSHA
does not explicitly refer to or provide for adherence to the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act; instead, the Act provides for a hybrid of in-
formal and formal rulemaking in its promulgation procedure. A pre-promul-
gation hearing is required if requested and is conducted under the substantial
evidence rule traditionally applied to formal rulemaking. See Industrial Union
Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 472-74 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
116. 29 U.S.C. §655(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
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review.1 17 Any person who is adversely affected by an OSHA
standard may file a petition challenging its validity in the appro-
priate United States Court of Appeals at any time prior to the
sixtieth day after issuance, promulgation, or modification.11 Bases
for review are specifically provided for in the Act. Thus, section
6(e) of the Act states that "[w]henever the Secretary promulgates
any standard, . . . he shall include a statement of the reasons for
such action, which shall be published in the Federal Register." 119
117. Id. § 655(o.
118. Id. The affected person must have participated in the administrative
proceedings. See Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
569 F.2d 831, 839 (5th Cir. 1978). Unless otherwise ordered, the filing does
not operate as a stay of the standard. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f). See Florida Peach
Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 126 (5th Cir.
1974). OSHA has authority to grant an administrative stay under § 10(d) of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 705 (1976); the courts, a judicial
stay under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See FED. R. App. P. 18.
The application for a stay must first be filed with the agency; then, in order
to obtain a temporary stay from a court, a petitioner must show that: (1) he
is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) he will be irreparably injured without a
stay; and (3) a stay would not cause substantial harm to the public interest.
United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 8 OSHC 1810 (D.C. Cir. 1980). OSHA tem-
porarily postponed the lead standard to facilitate judicial consideration of
motions to stay the standard pending full judicial review.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1976) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia Circuit has given an excellent summary of what the"statement of the reasons" should contain:
What we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the
Secretary, when his proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons
why he chooses to follow one course rather than another. Where that
choice purports to be based on the existence of certain determinable
facts, the Secretary must, in form as well as substance, find those facts
from evidence in the record. By the same token, when the Secretary
is obliged to make policy judgments where no factual certainties exist
or where facts alone do not provide the answer, he should so state
and go on to identify the considerations he found persuasive.
Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In
reviewing standards under § 6(f) of the Act, the courts have concentrated on
assuring that OSHA's statement of reasons gives a rational explanation of the
conclusions it has reached and that the statement indicates the available facts,
the areas of uncertainty and dispute, the alternative resolutions of those areas,
and the policies used to choose between alternatives. See, e.g., Synthetic
Organic Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1157 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 124 (5th Cir. 1974); Associated Indus., Inc. v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 354 (2d Cir. 1973). Section 6(f) of
the Act further provides that "[t]he determinations of the Secretary shall be
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a
whole." 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). The substantial evidence test provides for
more rigorous scrutiny of the promulgated standard than the usual arbitrary
and capricious test applicable to informal administrative rulemaking. Under
the substantial evidence test, a court must provide a careful check on the
agency's determinations without substituting its judgment for that of the agency.
The legislative history of the Act indicates, however, that standards were in-
tended to be promulgated pursuant to informal rulemaking procedures and
then reviewed by the less demanding "arbitrary and capricious test." SUBCOMM.
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The second responsibility of the employer under the Act, which
applies in all cases not covered by specific standards, is a general
duty to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm." 120
The phrase "causing or are likely to cause" has been construed to
refer to an accident likely to result in death or serious physical in-
jury, not to the likelihood of an accident's occurrence.' 2' This ob-
ligation, which is known as the "general duty clause," 122 was
ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d CONG.,
IST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
1189 (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
In view of this conflict between the apparent intent of Congress and the
clear language of the Act, courts have been forced to fashion their own tests
for determining the validity of standards. A blanket arbitrary and capricious
test has been rejected because of the express language in § 6 (f). See, e.g.,
Associated Indus., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d at 347-48; cf.
Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d at 129
(even under substantial evidence standard, court's task is to determine reason-
ableness of Secretary's action). But the courts have also generally applied some-
thing less than an across-the-board substantial evidence test. See, e.g., American
Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 830-31 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed,
101 S. Ct. 38 (1980); Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503
F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); Industrial
Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In American
Iron & Steel, the court, in deciding a challenge to the coke oven emissions
standard, stated: "As we examine the regulation at issue in this case, it is im-
perative to distinguish between determinations bottomed on factual matters,
and non-factual, legislative-like policy decisions. It is only the former that we
subject to the 'substantial evidence' test." 577 F.2d at 831.
Thus, the various courts of appeals, faced with the conflict between § 6(f)
of the Act and the apparent intent of Congress to relax formal rulemaking re-
quirements, have essentially adopted a hybrid scope of review. The Secretary's
policy determinations, which must be substantiated by a detailed statement of
reasons, are subject to the test of reasonableness. In reviewing determinations
other than factual findings, such as legal consequences, the scope of review is
generally "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law," as set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1976). See RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566, 570 (6th
Cir. 1979); Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Usery, 579 F.2d 536, 540 (9th
Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 577 F.2d 126, 130-31 (10th Cir.
1978); Marshall v. Knutson Constr. Co., 566 F.2d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1977);
Brennan v. OSHRC (Hanovia Lamp Div.), 502 F.2d 946, 951 (3d Cir. 1974).
The Second Circuit, however, has articulated that the scope of review is whether
OSHA's decision is unreasonable and inconsistent with the purpose of the regu-
lation in question. General Elec. Co. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir.
1978).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 645(a)(1) (1976).
121. Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Usery, 579 F.2d 536, 543 (9th
Cir. 1978); Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 568 F.2d 902, 910 (2d Cir.
1977).
122. The aspects of the general duty clause are: (a) failure of the employer
to render his workplace free from a hazard; (b) which is recognized either by
the custom and practice in the industry to which the employer belongs or by
the employer's actual knowledge; (c) to cause or likely to cause death or serious
bodily harm; and (d) which is preventable in the generic, not the particular,
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incorporated into the Act in order to cover the wide variety of
hazardous employment situations that fall outside the scope of spe-
cific standards.123  The general duty obligation is not designed,
however, to impose absolute liability for the idiosyncratic behavior
or negligence of employees. The obligation requires only that the
employer do all it can feasibly do to eliminate hazardous conditions
and hazardous conduct of employees. 124  The Act states this pur-
pose in its "so far as possible" wording, which is used in the pre-
amble. 125 As interpreted by the courts, this phrase denotes a goal
capable of achievement; it does not require the elimination of all
occupational hazards. 26 Thus, the Secretary of Labor has the bur-
den of showing by substantial evidence that specific, feasible meas-
ures would reduce the likelihood that injury from the hazard would
have occurred.127  In order to prove a violation of the general
sense. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265-66 &
n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
123. While general safety standards quite likely cover most conditions ad-
dressed by the specific standards, fairness to the employer requires the promul-
gation of specific safety standards where feasible. Senate OSHA Report, supra
note 6, at 5184. See Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. OSHRC, 529 F.2d 649,
656 (8th Cir. 1976). Lacking the omniscience to perceive the myriad conditions
in which specific standards might be addressed, however, the Secretary of Labor
must at times resort to the general duty clause. See Senate OSHA Report,
supra note 6, at 5185-86. Citations based on the general duty clause are limited
to serious, including willful or repeated, violations. But where a standard
covers a particular condition, the general duty clause should not be used as a
basis for citation. See American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504,
512 (8th Cir. 1974).
124. See, e.g., Schriber Sheet Metal & Roofers, Inc. v. OSHRC, 597 F.2d 78,
79 (6th Cir. 1979); Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Usery, 579 F.2d 536,
543 (9th Cir. 1978); Getty Oil Co. v. OSHRC, 530 F.2d 1143, 1145 (5th Cir.
1976). The clause was designed and intended to require "a good faith effort
to balance the need of workers to have a sale [sic] and healthy work environ-
ment against the requirement of industry to function without undue influence."
LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 119, at 435 (Remarks of Senator Williams).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
126. See, e.g., Brennan v. OSHRC (Hanovia Lamp Div.), 502 F.2d 946, 951
(3d Cir. 1974); REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822, 826 (2d Cir. 1974);
National Realty and Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.35 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
127. See, e.g., Champlin Petroleum Co. v. OSHRC, 593 F.2d 637, 640 (5th
Cir. 1979); Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Usery, 579 F.2d 536, 544 (9th
Cir. 1978); National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1268 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). The National Realty court reasoned that
[b]ecause employers have a general duty to do virtually everything
possible to prevent and repress hazardous conduct by employees, vio-
lations exist almost everywhere, and the Secretary has an awesomely
broad discretion in selecting defendants and in proposing penalties.
To assure that citations issue only upon careful deliberation, the
Secretary must be constrained to specify the particular steps a cited
employer should have taken to avoid citation, and to demonstrate the
feasibility and likely utility of those measures.
489 F.2d at 1268.
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duty clause, therefore, substantial evidence must show that a rea-
sonably prudent employer in the industry would have known that
a particular condition was required and that abatement was
feasible.
128
The general duty clause obligation has been applied to em-
ployee exposure to differentially toxic agents without requiring a
conflict with a specific standard. 129 A hazard detectable only by a
testing device or instrument and not simply by human senses also
has been held to fall within the scope of the general duty require-
ment.18 0 This does not mean, however, that the employer is a
strict liability insurer or guarantor, for the obligation imposed by
the general duty clause must be capable of achievement.181
In several cases construing the obligations imposed by the gen-
eral duty clause, the courts have found that the employer must
attempt to prevent hazardous conduct by employees through the
feasible precautions of training, supervising, and disciplining.
182
128. See General Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453, 465 (1st Cir.
1979).
129. See American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504 (8th Cir.
1974) (airborne lead).
130. See American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504, 511 (8th
Cir. 1974). But see Statement of Representative Steiger on December 17, 1970,
just prior to the House roll call on enacting OSHA:
The conference bill takes the approach of this House to the gen-
eral duty requirement that an employer maintain a safe and healthful
working environment. The conference-reported Bill recognizes the need
for such a provision where there is no existing specific standard ap-
plicable to a given situation. However, this requirement is made
realistic by its application only to situations where there are "recog-
nized hazards" which are likely to cause or are causing serious injury
or death. Such hazards are the type that can readily be detected on
the basis of the basic human senses. Hazards which require technical
or testing devices to detect them are not intended to be within the
scope of the general duty requirement. . . . It is expected that the
general duty requirement will be relied upon infrequently and that
primary reliance will be placed on specific standards which will be
promulgated under the act.
116 CONG. REc. 42,206 (1970).
In rejecting Representative Steiger's statement that hazards which require
technical or testing devices for detection are not within the scope of the gen-
eral duty requirement, the American Smelting court stated that "it does not
follow that his interpretation is correct; nor is it indicative of the entire Con-
gress' understanding of 'recognized.' " 501 F.2d at 509. The court noted that
the wording of the Act has been changed from "readily apparent" to "rec-
ognized" and reasoned that the latter denoted a broader meaning. Id. at
509-11.
131. See, e.g., Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017
(7th Cir. 1975); National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265-
66 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
132. See, e.g., I.T.O. Corp. v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976);
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541, 547 (3d Cir. 1976);
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Moreover, even if the employer has established rules against recog-
nized hazards, it must also assure that such rules are effectively
communicated to its employees. 33 It can be argued, therefore,
that the Act mandates the employment of safe employees as well
as safe employment.
By virtue of this obligation, OSHA can, must, and does regu-
late the employment of "safe" employees, for safe working conditions
cannot coexist with unsafe working conduct.8 4 In terms of safety,
studies have shown that the safest workers are experienced, white,
and about forty years old. l88 Thus, even without biochemical con-
siderations, OSHA by regulating for safe employees arguably re-
quires discrimination against blacks, most fertile women, the
handicapped, and both older and younger workers. When con-
sideration of exposure to toxic chemical agents is added, the Title
VII problem becomes acute. Although this obligation may not
conflict with Title VII to any great degree on an individual basis,
in terms of idosyncratic or susceptible groups, such as pregnant
women or employees of childbearing age, the problem is more dif-
ficult, and the obligation may conflict with Title VII.
Under OSHA, the employer and the employees must share re-
sponsibility for this problem and cooperate in increasing the safety
of working conditions.' "6 This purpose is set forth in section
2 (b) (2) of the Act, which provides "that employers and employees
have separate but dependent responsibilities and rights with respect
to achieving safe and healthful working conditions." 137 Employees,
in fact, are expressly required to comply with all standards, rules,
regulations, and orders issued pursuant to the Act that are applica-
Horne Plumbing & Heating Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564, 569 (5th Cir.
1976); Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.
1975); Brennan v. OSHRC (Hanovia Lamp Div.), 502 F.2d 946, 952 (3d Cir.
1974).
133. General Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453, 465 (1st Cir.
1979); Champlin Petroleum Co. v. OSHRC, 593 F.2d 637, 640-41 (5th Cir.
1979).
134. Danco Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 586 F.2d 1243, 1247 (8th Cir. 1978);
Getty Oil Co. v. OSHRC, 530 F.2d 1143, 1146 (5th Cir. 1976); Brennan v.
Butler Lime 8 Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 1975); REA Express,
Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822, 826 (2d Cir. 1974); National Realty & Constr.
Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266-67 & n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
135. Cohen, Factors in Successful Occupational Safety Programs, 9 J. SAF.
REs. 168 (1978); Denton, The Unsafe Act: Exploring the Dark Side of Accident
Control, 13 PROFESSIONAL SA, iTv 60 (July 1979); LeShan, Dynamics in Ac-
cident-Prone Behavior, 15 Psycii. 73 (1952); Smith, Characteristics of Successful
Safety Programs, 10 J. SAr. REs. 5 (1978).
136. See Atlantic 8c Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541, 552-53
(3d Cir. 1976).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
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ble to their own actions and conduct; 18 in theory, they could be
cited for working under hazardous conditions. 139 In spite of the
Act's imposition of duties upon employees they are not now subject
to legal sanctions or penalties for their noncompliance.
1 40
Since the enforcement scheme of the Act sanctions only the
employer, the employer has the double responsibility of complying
with the Act and assuring compliance by its employees, for the
refusal of employees to fulfill the Act does not automatically
absolve the employer of liability.'4 ' This does not mean that em-
ployees need not comply with their responsibilities and obligations
under the Act, however, for an employer can bargain in good faith
with representatives of its employees for the right to discharge or
discipline any employee who disobeys an OSHA standard, since oc-
cupational safety and health would seem to be subsumed within the
subjects of mandatory collective bargaining (wages, hours, and con-
ditions of employment) under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).' 42 Consistent with its duty to bargain in good faith, the
employer can insist to the point of impasse upon the right not only
to promulgate enforceable safety and health rules, but also to dis-
charge or discipline disobedient, unsafe, or hazardous employees. 43
It must be noted in this respect that employees are by regulation
given the right to refuse to work under hazardous conditions which
they reasonably believe present danger of death or serious injury. 44
138. Id. § 654(b).
139. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 722 n.8 (6th Cir. 1979),
aff'd, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
140. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541, 553 (3d
Cir. 1976) (relying on Secretary of Labor's opinion letter). See also Senate
OSHA Report, supra note 6, at 5187. In this regard, compare OSHA with the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, which provides for civil penalties
against miners as well as employers for violation of certain mandatory health or
safety standards embodied in the Act. 30 U.S.C. § 820 (a), (d), (g) (Supp. III
1979).
141. I.T.O. Corp. v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976); Atlantic &
Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541, 555 (3d Cir. 1976).
142. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976). See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co.,
343 U.S. 395, 409 (1952); NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822, 825 (5th
Cir. 1967).
143. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541, 555 (3d
Cir. 1976). In Atlantic & Gulf, the court reasoned that occupational health and
safety was a mandatory collective bargaining subject under § 158(d) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). 534 F.2d at 555.
144. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980). In Whirlpool
Corp., the Supreme Court upheld a Department of Labor regulation which
specifically permits an employee to refuse to work under hazardous conditions
that he reasonably believes present a real danger of death or serious injury.
The regulation provides:
(b)(1) On the other hand, review of the Act and examination of
the legislative history discloses that, as a general matter, there is no
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Susceptible employees conceivably could utilize this right, with
OSHA approval, to refuse to expose themselves to toxic agents in
the workplace by refusing to work. Because employees are per-
mitted to take this action, it apparently would not be a violation
of the Act for the employer to respond to their objective concern
regarding exposure to a toxic hazard by removing them from the
workplace. Strictly speaking, the employer could be in violation
of the anti-discrimination provision of the Act if it took any ad-
verse action with respect to the employees who exercised this
right.14
5
right afforded by the Act which would entitle employees to walk off
the job because of potential unsafe conditions at the workplace.
Hazardous conditions which may be violative of the Act will ordi-
narily be corrected by the employer, once brought to his attention....
(2) However, occasions might arise when an employee is con-
fronted with a choice between not performing assigned tasks or sub-
jecting himself to serious injury or death arising from a hazardous
condition at the workplace. If the employee, with no reasonable al-
ternative, refuses in good faith to expose himself to the dangerous
condition, he would be protected against subsequent discrimination.
The condition causing the employee's apprehension of death or injury
must be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under the circum-
stances then confronting the employees, would conclude that there is
a real danger of death or serious injury and that there is insufficient
time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate the danger
through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels. In addition,
in such circumstances, the employee, where possible, must also have
sought from his employer, and been unable to obtain, a correction of
the dangerous condition.
29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1980).
Thus, employees may withdraw from a workplace to avoid hazardous con-
ditions. However, as the Court noted, the regulation does not, as Congress
did not, require employers to pay workers who refuse to perform their assigned
tasks in the face of imminent danger. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S.
1 (1980). An employer discriminates against an employee only when he treats
that employee less favorably than he treats other employees similarly situated.
145. Section ll(c)(1) of OSHA provides:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted
or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act
or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or because
of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of any
right afforded by this Act.
29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976). OSHA regulations set up a mechanism for the
redress of any discrimination against an employee that was occasioned by the
employee's exercise of any right afforded by the Act, "[i]f [the] protected ac-
tivity was a substantial reason for the [discrimination or the discriminatory]
action would not have taken place 'but for' [the] engagement in protected
activity." 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6(b) (1980). Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) (preventing
the refusal of employees, under the NLRA, to work in abnormally dangerous
conditions from being considered a strike. For application of § 143, see
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 385-87 (1974).
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The Act did not, however, guarantee job security.14  Thus,
with or without approval of the employees' collective bargaining
representative (or unilaterally if the employees are not represented),
an employer has the authority and the obligation to enforce com-
pliance with OSHA safety and health standards and to insist that
only safe employees be permitted to work. 47
Since the Act is a remedial and safety statute, limited or nar-
row construction is to be eschewed. It must be interpreted in light
of its primary purpose, the preservation of human life and the
assurance of safe and healthful working conditions. 48  The Act
does not permit employers to force workers to labor under immi-
nently hazardous conditions. OSHA's requirements may conflict,
however, with either the NLRA or Title VII. When safety and
health activities under OSHA and the NLRA conflict with one
another, OSHA and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
have agreed that OSHA's interest is paramount. 49 The agencies
have reasoned that safety and health are specifically and primarily
the purpose of OSHA and are only generally included in the
broader right to engage in concerted activities under the NLRA. 50
In fact, NLRB jurisdiction only takes precedence where necessary
to maintain the preeminence of safety and health conditions, pre-
vent violation of safety and health laws, or prevent employee expo-
146. See Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 599
F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1979) (invalidating a regulation promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor which gave OSHA the final say on the medical fitness of
an employee).
147. See Olin Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 291 (1979) (Knudson, Arb.).
In Olin Corp., a company decision to exclude female employees, age 18 to 50,
who were capable of childbearing from a plant with potentially high lead ex-
posure was held to have been done in good faith to protect employee health
and not to have violated a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 295. See
also Phoenix Forging Co., 71 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 879 (1978) (Dash, Arb.);
American Smelting & Ref. Co., 69 Lab. Arb. &c Disp. Settl. 824 (1977) (Hutche-
son, Arb.); J.R. Simplot Co., 68 Lab. Arb. &c Disp. Settl. 912 (1977) (Conont,
Arb.); A.O. Smith Corp., 58 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 784 (1972) (Volz, Arb.).
148. See notes 109-12 & 120-24 and accompanying text supra.
149. In 1975, the NLRB General Counsel and the Labor Department
Solicitor entered into a memorandum of understanding for the procedural co-
ordination of litigation concerning complaints filed under § 11(c) of OSHA and
§ 8 of the NLRA. 40 Fed. Reg. 26,083 (1975). The OSHA/NLRB understand-
ing is intended to provide explicit procedures for avoiding conflict and dupli-
cative litigation without diminishing employee rights under either Act. Id.
Because employee rights to engage in health and safety-related activities are
more specifically protected by OSHA, the understanding provides for the de-
ferral or dismissal of an NLRB charge when the factual matters and issues
alleged in the charge are the subject of a complaint under § 11(c). Id. The
NLRB General Counsel will, where appropriate, notify employees who have
filed an unfair labor practice charge of the right to file a complaint under
OSHA. Id. at 26,084.
150. Id. at 26,083.
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sure to hazards in the workplace. Is this not the route that the
EEOC should also take, for are safety and health not paramount to
equal employment opportunity?
B. Feasibility Considerations
Various federal laws require that regulatory decisions be based
solely or primarily upon the feasibility of controlling the release
of or human exposure to toxic or cancer-causing substances. OSHA
is such a law. Congress mandated in the Act that any severe risk
to employee health and safety must be eliminated if feasible means
exist.151 This calls for a two step analysis of OSHA: (1) determin-
ing whether a material health impairment is threatened by the
suspect substance; and (2) determining whether the selected method
of protecting workers from this risk is technologically and eco-
nomically feasible.
152
The Act mentions feasibility only once, as a factor relevant
in the formulation of permanent standards for toxic materials and
harmful physical agents. 153 The Secretary of Labor is required to
promulgate a health and safety standard "which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, on the best available evidence, that
no employee will suffer material impairment of health or func-
tional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the
hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working
life." 154 In attaining the highest degree of feasible health and
151. The House Report concluded that "even the price of one life is too
expensive when a meaningful occupational safety and health law could save
many lives . . . . The well-being of every American working man and woman
is an essential human right which we no longer deny." H.R. REP. No. 91-1291,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
119, at 864. See also Senate OSHA Report, supra note 6, at 5222.
152. Material impairment of health is not defined in the Act. In the
cotton dust case, however, the court, while not deciding what constitutes mate-
rial impairment, found that all parties conceded that byssinosis causes material
impairment in its chronic stage. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 56, 68 (1980) (petitioners granted certiorari sepa-
rately). In that case, the textile industry's argument rested on the claim that
the agency need not guard against the acute but reversible symptoms of bys-
sinosis (brown lung disease), because they do not themselves constitute a mate-
rial impairment of health. 617 F.2d at 654. The court found that OSHA's
mandate does not restrain it from acting to prevent reversible health damage
until workers actually suffer the early symptoms of byssinosis but rather it is a
mandate to reduce the risk of irreversible damage, especially for those workers
who have regular exposure to the causal agent, cotton dust. Id.
153. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
154. Id. The phrase "to the extent feasible," which has taken on judicial
significance, was added by Senator Jacob Javits who stated:
As a result of this amendment the Secretary, in setting standards, is
expressly required to consider feasibility of proposed standards. This
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safety protection for the employee, other factors to be considered
are the latest available scientific data in the field and experience
gained under this and other health and safety laws. 155 Even in the
sensitive and fright-laden matter of cancer, 56 in which courts have
recognized the need for action based upon lower standards of proof
than are otherwise applicable,157 evidence of feasibility still will be
required. 58
Neither the statute nor the legislative history, however, de-
fines feasibility or explains how the required limitations on safety
and health are to be determined. These determinations have been
left to administrative and judicial development. According to the
courts, feasibility considerations include both economic and tech-
nological factors. 59 Thus, the overall feasibility issue to be deter-
mined by courts and administrative agencies is whether the safety
and health protection that a standard is designed to afford warrants
the required technological difficulty and economic cost of compli-
ance in general, and under what circumstances a particular em-
ployer's technological and economic hardship is entitled to
consideration.
1. Economic Feasibility
While some observers have suggested that the Act was in-
tended to protect workers regardless of the economic impact on
is an improvement over the Daniels bill [House bill] which might be
interpreted to require absolute health and safety in all cases, regardless
of feasibility, and the Administration bill which contains criteria for
standards.
Senate OSHA Report, supra note 6, at 5222. See generally Berger & Riskin,
Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Substances Under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 285 (1978).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d
109, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1975); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,
477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
156. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 538 (D.C. Cir.
1972). Courts traditionally have shown a special interest in protecting public
health, especially when cancer is involved. See, e.g., Environmental Defense
Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Certified Color Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Mathews, 543 F.2d 284, 297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
157. See cases cited in note 156 supra. See also Reserve Mining Co. v.
EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
158. See, e.g., American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 832 (3d
Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 38 (1980); Society of the Plastics Indus.,
Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
159. See, e.g., American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 832-37
(3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 38 (1980); AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530
F.2d 109, 120-23 (3d Cir. 1975). Accord, United Parcel Serv. v. OSHRC, 570
F.2d 806, 811-12 (8th Cir. 1978); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d
467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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employers, the prevailing interpretation of the feasibility limitation
is that a standard that is prohibitively expensive is not "feasible."
As the District of Columbia Circuit stated in Industrial Union
Department v. Hodgson,160 "Congress does not appear to have in-
tended to protect employees by putting their employers out of
business - either by requiring protective devices unavailable under
existing technology or by making financial viability generally im-
possible." 11 On the other hand, "[s]tandards may be economically
feasible even though, from the standpoint of employers, they are
financially burdensome and affect profit margins adversely." 162
Implementation of the standard must approach "massive disloca-
tion" or adversely affect the competitive structure of the industry
in order to be characterized as economically infeasible.
16 3
Most of the cases that have addressed the economic aspect of
feasibility have focused solely on the employer's cost in meeting
the standards requirements. In Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v.
OSHRC,164 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
160. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
161. Id. at 478. Accord, AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 550 F.2d 109, 122-23 (3d
Cir. 1975). The considerations involved in making such a determination were
discussed in the Industrial Union Dep't decision:
This qualification [of economic feasibility] is not intended to pro-
vide a route by which recalcitrant employers or industries may avoid
the reforms contemplated by the Act. Standards may be economically
feasible, even though, from the standpoint of employers, they are
financially burdensome and affect profit margins adversely. Nor does
the concept of economic feasibility necessarily guarantee the continued
existence of individual employers. It would appear to . . . envisage
the economic demise of an employer who has lagged behind the rest of
the industry in protecting the health and safety of employees and is
consequently financially unable to comply with new standards as
quickly as other employers. As the effect becomes more widespread
within an industry, the problem of economic feasibility becomes more
pressing. For example, if the standard requires changes that only a
few leading firms could quickly achieve, delay might be necessary to
avoid increasing the concentration of that industry.
499 F.2d at 478 (footnote omitted).
162. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 478.
163. Id. In American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 38 (1980), the court found that the coke oven
emissions standard met the economic feasibility test (in part because of the
strong support of the United Steelworkers Union for the standard) of § 6(b)(5)
because it was "not persuaded that its implementation would precipitate any-
thing approaching the massive dislocation which would characterize an eco-
nomically infeasible standard." 577 F.2d at 836 (citation omitted).
164. 534 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1976). The employers contended that the long-
shoring hardhat standard, as applied to them, was economically infeasible, and
hence invalid, because attempts at enforcement would provoke a wildcat strike
by employees. Id. at 545, 552. The court found that the employers had failed
to establish the infeasibility of the challenged regulation, because they did not
show that they had taken steps to discipline or discharge employees who defied
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cuit was the first federal court to consider the question of economic
feasibility in conjunction with the question of reasonable neces-
sity,165 noting that in a section 6 (f) proceeding, the Secretary of
Labor has an affirmative burden to demonstrate the reasonableness
of an adopted standard.166
The Fifth Circuit recently expanded upon this relationship
between the reasonable necessity and economic feasibility require-
ments set forth in the Act, holding that OSHA must determine
that a standard is not only feasible but also reasonably necessary.167
Analogizing to its earlier decision in Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v.
Consumer Product Safety Commission,'68 the court in American
Petroleum Institute v. OSHA 169 asserted that, in promulgating the
benzene standard, OSHA failed to assess the benefits to be achieved
by the action in light of the expected costs of compliance - that is,
"the benefits expected from the standard [must] bear a reasonable
relationship to the costs imposed by the standard." 170 The ap-
the standard. Id. at 555-56. Furthermore, according to the court, the em-
ployers had several other legal remedies available to them. Id.
165. Id. at 548 (Secretary's rule-making duty "comprehends weighing the
competing considerations of economic burden and improvement of safety").
166. Id. at 551. Section 652(8) of OSHA codifies the balancing concept of
reasonableness in its definition of "occupational safety and health standard" as
one "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employ-
ment and places of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
167. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 501-03 (5th Cir.
1978), aff'd sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100
S. Ct. 2844 (1980).
168. 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978) (interpreting the reasonable necessity
criterion of the Consumer Product Safety Act as requiring the Consumer
Product Safety Commission to take a hard look not only at the nature and
severity of the risk but also at the potential the standard has for reducing the
severity and frequency of injury and the effect the standard would have on the
utility, cost and availability of the product).
169. 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), afl'd sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't
v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980).
170. 581 F.2d at 503 (citation omitted). The employers in this case argued
that
by defining an "occupational safety and health standard" as one re-
quiring conditions "reasonably necessary" to provide safe or healthful
places of employment, . . . Congress recognized that safety and health
resources are not unlimited and required OSHA somewhere in its
decision-making process to (I) attempt to determine the extent to
which its standards will benefit workers, and (2) decide whether the
projected benefits justify the costs of compliance with the standard.
Only if all standards are subjected to such assessment, . . . , can
OSHA assure maximum benefit from the finite amount industry can
expend on safety and health and thus carry out Congress' overriding
policy "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in
the Nation safe and healthful working conditions."
Id. at 501 (citations omitted).
OSHA denied that the "reasonably necessary" language imposed any sub-
stantive obligation on it in promulgating standards, distinguishing Aqua Slide
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peals court stated that although the Act mandates a goal of attain-
ment of the highest degree of protection for employees' health and
safety, "it does not give OSHA the unbridled discretion to adopt
standards designed to create absolutely risk-free workplaces re-
gardless of cost." 171 Rather, standards must be feasible, and in
determining feasibility the costs of proposed standards must be
balanced against the proposed benefits flowing therefrom in order
that resources can be allocated in priority of the degree of harm
stopped.
In two other recent cases, the issue of costs and benefits has also
been addressed with divergent results. In RMI Co. v. Secretary of
Labor,72 the Sixth Circuit affirmed a finding of the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission of technological feasibility
of noise controls, but remanded the case for consideration of the
economic feasibility of those controls in terms of the costs and bene-
fits. 17 8 Although the court did not discuss specifically the relation-
ship between economic feasibility and reasonable necessity, it found
that "[i]n order to justify the expenditure, there must be a rea-
sonable assurance that there will be an appreciable and correspond-
ing improvement in working conditions." '74 While the court
declined to adopt a rigid formula for conducting a cost-benefit
analysis, it did say that OSHA must weigh the costs of compliance
against the expected benefits in order to determine whether a pro-
'N' Dive on the basis that the "reasonably necessary" language in the Consumer
Product Safety Act appeared as a part of the promulgation procedure section
rather than the definitional section as in OSHA. Id. at 501. Compare 15
U.S.C. § 2058(c)(2)(A) (1976) with 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
The court declined to construe the similar requirements of the two acts
differently or to read words out of the OSHA legislation, stating that "[t]he
Act imposes on OSHA the obligation to enact only standards that are reason-
ably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful workplaces. If a
standard does not fit in this definition, it is not one that OSHA is authorized
to enact." 581 F.2d at 502.
171. 581 F.2d at 502 (emphasis added). The Court held that before OSHA
regulates, it "must show that a hazard exists and that its regulation will reduce
the risk from the hazard, for 'no (occupational safety and health] standard
would be expected to impose added costs or inconvenience . . . unless there
is reasonable assurance that the frequency or severity of injuries or illnesses
will be reduced.'" Id. at 502-03, quoting Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d at 839. Addressing the specific standard
involved in the case, the American Petroleum court indicated that until OSHA
could demonstrate that reducing the benzene exposure limit from 10 ppm to
I ppm bore a reasonable relationship to the costs imposed by the reduction, it
could not show that the standard was reasonably necessary to provide safe or
healthful workplaces. 581 F.2d at 504.
172. 594 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1979).
173. Id. at 569-73. See also Turner Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d 82
(7th Cir. 1977).
174. 594 F.2d at 573.
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posed remedy is economically feasible. 75 Since the paramount
objective of the statute is to enhance the health and safety of em-
ployees, the court reasoned that the benefits to employees should
weigh heavier on the scale than the costs to employers. 178 Accord-
ingly, controls will not necessarily be economically infeasible merely
because they are expensive; however, they will not necessarily be
economically feasible "merely because the employer can easily (or
otherwise) afford them." 17
In AFL-CIO v. Marshall,178 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, dealing with an industry
challenge to the cotton dust standard, rejected the assertion that un-
der economic feasibility considerations OSHA must demonstrate
that the benefits of the standard are in proportion to the costs it
imposes.179 The court held that the Act constrains OSHA's regu-
lation of dangerous substances "only by the limits of feasibility;"
that a formal cost-benefit analysis, while encouraged, is not required
in the Act; and that no additional constraint is imposed by the
Act's definition of a health or safety standard as reasonably neces-
sary. 80 According to the court, by excluding "unreasonable risk"
language from OSHA but including it in the Consumer Product
Safety Act (CPSA), Congress had drawn the sensible conclusion
that consumers may be in a better position than workers to evalu-
ate, estimate, and avoid risks.' 8 ' If this is the case, what then of
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 573-75.
178. 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 56, 68 (1980)
(petitioners granted certiorari separately).
179. 617 F.2d at 662-66. In rejecting the textile industry's argument that
OSHA must conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis, the court found no reference
to a cost-benefit analysis in the Act's legislative history. Id. at 664. Rather,
Congress struck the balance between costs and benefits in the mandate of
§ 6(b)(5) of the Act, which directs OSHA to "set the standard which most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evi-
dence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity." Id. at 663-64, quoting 29 U.S.C. § 665(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
The court contrasted OSHA with other statutory schemes which explicitly re-
quire particular kinds of analysis. See, e.g., the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857f-6c(c)(2)(B) (1976) (requiring the EPA to perform a cost-benefit analysis
before prohibiting the manufacture or sale of fuel); the Federal Environmental
Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1976) (requiring consideration
of "economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits"); the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261(s) (1976) (requiring "unreasonable
risk of personal injury or illness"); the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2605(a) (requiring the chemical to present unreasonable risk of injury or
health to the environment).
180. 617 F.2d at 664.
181. Id. at 665 n.169.
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the purpose of the CPSA to protect consumers from hazards in the
market place where they are unaware of the dangers posed and thus
are unable to make their own decisions about whether to assume
the risk? 182 Is the worker's awareness of risks in the workplace
really more limited than that of most consumers?
The expected resolution of the divergent opinions relative to
the requirement of conducting a cost-benefit analysis did not ma-
terialize in the Supreme Court's review of American Petroleum In-
stitute.83 While a plurality of the Court accepted the Fifth Cir-
cuit's reasoning that OSHA, before issuing any standard, must
determine that it is reasonably necessary and appropriate under
Section 3 (8) of the Act to remedy a significant risk of material
health impairment, the Court's plurality opinion then stated:
Only after the Secretary has made the threshold determina-
tion that such a risk exists with respect to a toxic sub-
stance, would it be necessary to decide whether § 6 (b) (5)
requires him to select the most protective standard he
can consistent with economic and technological feasibility,
or whether . . . the benefits of the regulation must be
commensurate with the costs of its implementation. Be-
cause the Secretary did not make the required threshold
finding in this case, we have no occasion to determine
whether costs must be weighed against benefits in an ap-
propriate case.' s4
Referring, however, to the fact that sections 6 (g) and 6 (b) (8) of
the Act require the Secretary to undertake some cost-benefit analysis
before promulgating a standard, the Court stated that Congress
intended at a minimum that the Secretary of Labor find "a sig-
nificant risk of harm and therefore a probability of significant
benefits before establishing a new standard." 185 Justice Powell
182. See 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1976).
183. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844
(1980).
184. Id. at 2863.
185. Id. at 2865. OSHA has implemented two changes in its permanent
Cancer Policy standard in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980). First, in
order to conform with the Court's mandate that OSHA consider the significance
of the risk before regulating a toxic substance, OSHA deleted the provisions of
the Cancer Policy which required the automatic setting of the lowest feasible
level of exposure. See 46 Fed. Reg. 4889, 4890 (1981). Second, OSHA pub-
lished proposed amendments to the Cancer Policy. Id. at 7402. The agency
stated that the proposed amendments are intended to comply with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Act as requiring that
a determination of the significance of the risk be made prior to the
issuance of a carcinogen Standard, that the exposure limit be set at the
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alone took a partial step toward approving the Fifth Circuit's posi-
tion on cost-benefit comparison.18 6 The Court will, however, ad-
dress the question anew in its 1981 term.
187
Regardless of what form of cost-benefit analysis the Secretary
of Labor must undertake before a standard is promulgated, it
seems clear that to some extent it must quantify and compare bene-
fits with risks in order to show that a standard is feasible. The
term feasibility, moreover, should be interpreted according to its or-
dinary and common meaning, that is, practicable.' This means
that the relative cost of implementing engineering controls should
be compared with the cost and effectiveness of instituting adminis-
trative controls and utilizing personal protective equipment. Pos-
sibly on this basis, OSHA must suppress its stated disdain for such
means of employee protection. 8 9
2. Technological Feasibility
In setting permanent standards dealing with toxic substances,
the Act, as interpreted by the courts, requires that OSHA evaluate
technological feasibility. 90 Thus, in establishing exposure levels,
lowest feasible level which is reasonably necessary or appropriate to
eliminate significant risk, and that OSHA must consider all relevant
evidence in making these determinations.
Id. at 7402-03.
186. 100 S. Ct. at 2877 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
Justice Powell asserted that even if OSHA met its burden of proof on the
threshold question, it would still have to demonstrate that there was a reason-
able relationship between the economic effects and the expected benefits of the
standard. Id.
187. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted,
101 S. Ct. 56, 68 (1980) (petitioners granted certiorari separately). The District
of Columbia Circuit, following its cotton dust decision, again rejected a cost-
benefit analysis in the lead standard case. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 8
OSHC 1810 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Two recent developments have cast doubt on
both the viability of the occupational health standard regulating employee ex-
posure to cotton dust and OSHA's continued disfavor of cost-benefit analysis in
setting occupational health standards. In accordance with a Reagan adminis-
tration executive order mandating cost-benefit analysis in certain rulemakings,
the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of Labor, Thorne G. Auchter, has
called for a reevaluation of the cotton dust standard, 29 C.F.R. 1910.1043
(1980). 46 Fed. Reg. 19503 (1981). The policy underlying the executive order
promises to hold broad implications for the efficacy of existing OSHA limits on
exposure to toxic substances in the workplace. See Exec. Order No. 12291, 46
Fed. Reg. 13191 (1981).
188. See Turner Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d 82, 83 (7th Cir. 1977).
189. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct.
2844, 2863-64 & n.46 (1980); note 246 and accompanying text infra.
190. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 56, 68 (1980) (petitioners granted certiorari separately);
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 832 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.




Nothstein and Ayres: Sex-Based Considerations of Differentiation in the Workplace: Exp
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the Secretary of Labor must consider whether the companies af-
fected are able to reduce the levels of exposure to those required
through feasible engineering means.191 The Secretary is not re-
stricted, however, to the status quo. In holding that the vinyl
chloride standard was feasible, the Second Circuit did not constrain
OSHA to promulgate standards only achievable by existing tech-
nology, but rather permitted the agency to require improvements
in existing technology or the development of reasonably achievable
new technology. 10 2  OSHA may thus be viewed, at least to a lim-
ited extent, as a technology-forcing piece of legislation: standards
do not necessarily become infeasible because they force the develop-
ment of new technology, impose substantial research and develop-
ment costs on industry, or even force some employers out of
business. 19 3
Courts have not construed OSHA in so "procrustean" a fash-
ion that the result of the promulgation and application of a stand-
ard is the elimination of all affected businesses and jobs.
194
Although the most certain way to eliminate industrial hazards from
toxic substances is to eliminate industry, the congressional state-
ment of findings and declaration of purpose and policy in the
Act 19 show that upgrading of working conditions, instead of com-
pletely eliminating hazardous occupations, was the intention. 196
191. Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385, 390
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975); Industrial Union Dep't v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
192. See Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 922 (1975), citing Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 401 (10th Cir. 1974) (Clean Air Act);
Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 673 (6th Cir. 1972)
(Automobile Safety Act).
193. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 661-62 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 56, 68 (1980) (petitioners granted certiorari separately);
American Iron &: Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 835-36 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 38 (1980); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC,
534 F.2d at 548; Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 478.
194. AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975).
195. Section 651 of OSHA reads in relevant part:
(a) The Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out
of work situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hin-
drance to, interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss,
medical expenses, and disability compensation payments.
(b) The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the
exercise of its powers to regulate commerce among the several States
and with foreign nations and to provide for the general welfare, to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation
safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human
resources ....
29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976).
196. AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975).
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In enacting OSHA, Congress did not intend to impose strict lia-
bility on employers for unavoidable or unsolvable occupational
hazards. 197 The Act only requires new and innovative controls in
production techniques that might be obtained through develop-
ments presently unforeseeable.18s
The possibility exists that a particular safety and health stand-
ard previously considered technologically feasible will be deter-
mined to be technologically infeasible or otherwise unreasonable
after employers have made a good faith effort to comply.109 If the
exposure limit cannot be met after engineering controls and work
practices are implemented, the Act establishes procedures for ob-
taining a variance from the standard.200 A variance relieves cer-
tain employers from compliance with the standards regulating
exposure to toxic substances and permits them, as an alternative to
compliance, to exclude susceptible persons from the workplace. 20'
If the technological capabilities and advances in the state of the
art are not available or feasible for the industry as a whole, how-
ever, individual variance proceedings would not be applicable. In
197. Brennan v. OSHRC (Hanovia Lamp Div.), 502 F.2d 946, 951 (3d Cir.
1974). The Third Circuit stated in this regard that
there are industrial activities involving hazards so great and of such
little social utility that the Secretary would be justified in concluding
that their total prohibition is proper if there is no technologically
feasible method of eliminating the operational hazard. But although
Congress gave the Secretary license to make such a determination in
specific instances, it did not direct him to do so in every instance
where total elimination of risk is beyond the reach of present tech-
nology....
[W]e agree with the Second Circuit ... that OSHA is to be viewed
as a technology-forcing piece of legislation. Thus the Secretary would
not be justified in dismissing an alternative to a proposed health and
safety standard as infeasible when the necessary technology looms on
today's horizon .... [But here] compliance . . . is not technologically
feasible in the "near future." This finding necessarily implies con-
sideration both of existing technological capabilities and imminent
advances in the art. We do not believe that the Act imposes any
heavier obligation.
530 F.2d at 121-22 (citations and footnotes omitted).
198. See notes 193-94 supra. For a discussion of the problems judges face
in determining the feasibility of technical standards, see Oakes, The Judicial
Role in Environmental Law, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 498 (1977).
199. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d at 550.
200. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(d) (1976). Subsection (d) states that "[a]ny affected
employer may apply to the Secretary for a rule or order for a variance from a
standard promulgated under this section." Id.
201. Rather than permit higher exposure levels, § 655(d) requires that the
employer seeking a variance demonstrate that "the conditions, practices, means,
methods, operations, or processes used or proposed to be used .. .will provide
employment and places of employment ...which are as safe and healthful as
those which would prevail if he complied with the standard." Id.
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such a case, the standard as a whole would not be feasible, or at
least the lower standard required for certain susceptible groups
would not be feasible. Under these circumstances, removal of
susceptible persons from the workplace is mandated, or an industry-
wide variance must be granted until technology catches up.
Lack of feasibility was specifically recognized in the lead stand-
ard in which OSHA stated that the proposed PEL would not
protect the fetus or workers who plan pregnancies. 20 2 OSHA was
forced to include the removal action in the lead standard 208 be-
cause it is required to regulate on the basis of knowledge rather
than on the unknown. Accordingly, conclusions concerning the
technological feasibility of a standard must be based on evidence,
not speculation.2 4 Technological feasibility required by the Act
does not include technologies which might never be developed or
which, at best, would not be available for several years.2°  Con-
gress recognized, however, that conclusive medical and scientific
evidence, including causative factors, epidemiological studies, or
dose-response data, may not exist for many toxic agents, and there-
fore, mandated that standards should not be postponed because
definitive medical and scientific evidence is currently unavailable.
These considerations are particularly relevant to those situa-
tions in which OSHA standards regulating exposures to hazardous
or potentially hazardous agents are set so low that an employer is
faced with wholesale violations of Title VII in order to comply
with OSHA. Title VII has no cost defense similar to that per-
mitted under OSHA, 206 however, and fair employment liability will
be incurred and ordered remedied regardless of employer cost.
Conversely, because cost is a consideration and a defense under
OSHA, the likelihood and expense of Title VII liability, if it
amounts to a possibility of putting employers out of business,
should be a defense to OSHA violations.
202. See notes 73-78 and accompanying text supra.
203. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
204. Marshall v. West Point Pepperell, Inc., 588 F.2d 979, 983-85 (5th Cir.
1979); AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1975). Cf. ASG
Indus., Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 593 F.2d 1323, 1334 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979) ("the Commission's authority to predicate
a finding of unreasonable risk on the projection of technological advance
occurring in the future requires that the agency have some basis in its records
and files supporting the projection as meaningful and reasonable, as con-
trasted with mere speculative desire").
205. Marshall v. West Point Pepperell, Inc., 588 F.2d 979, 985 (5th Cir.
1979).
206. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
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Similarly under the general duty clause,207 preventing the
"hazardous conduct exposure" of members of the sex at risk argu-
ably ceases to be "capable of achievement," due to the illegality
under Title VII of preventing such persons from being exposed to
the hazard. Rationally, contrary law should be as much a part of
a consideration of feasibility as is expense or technology.
In order to avoid this conflict, would it be possible for the
Secretary of Labor simply to stay his authority in promulgating or
enforcing standards that require employers to provide safe and
healthful employment and working conditions? The District
Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia are
battling over the extent of the Secretary's discretion to avoid set-
ting standards. In National Congress of Hispanic American Citi-
zens v. Dunlop,208 the members of El Congresso brought an action
seeking the promulgation of various standards for migrant farm
workers. The district court initially held that the Secretary, once
petitioned, must promulgate a standard within the time limits
specified in the Act.20 9 The district court's decision was reversed
and remanded by the court of appeals, which held that the Secre-
tary has discretion to promulgate or not to promulgate a standard.
210
Upon remand, the district court essentially reiterated its initial
position, stating that while it recognized that the setting of rule-
making priorities is a matter within the Secretary's discretion, no
criteria were established to enable the court to determine whether
he had acted rationally.211 On appeal, the District of Columbia
Circuit again reversed the decision of the lower court, stating that
"[s]o long as his action is rational in the context of the statute, and
is taken in good faith, the Secretary has authority to delay develop-
207. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
208. 425 F. Supp. 900 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Na-
tional Congress of Hispanic Am. Citizens v. Usery, 554 F.2d 1196 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
209. 425 F. Supp. at 902. Section 655(b) of OSHA contains various time
frames for recommendations, comments, objections, and hearings on proposed
standards. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1-4) (1976). The Secretary, arguing that the
time limits were discretionary, relied on § 65 5(g) which states in pertinent
part: "In determining the priority for establishing standards under this section,
the Secretary shall give due regard to the urgency of the need for mandatory
safety and health standards for particular industries, trades, crafts, occupations,
businesses, workplaces or work environments." 425 F. Supp. at 902 & n.1,
quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655(g) (1976).
210. National Congress of Hispanic Am. Citizens v. Usery, 554 F.2d 1196,
1199-1200 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
211. National Congress of Hispanic Am. Citizens v. Marshall, 6 OSHC
2157, 2159 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 626 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
1980-81]
47
Nothstein and Ayres: Sex-Based Considerations of Differentiation in the Workplace: Exp
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ment of a standard at any stage as priorities demand." 212 The
determination of criteria were found to be rational and reasonable,
but the appeals court again remanded, requiring the Secretary to
fulfill his good faith duty by submitting a timetable regarding his
expectation as to when a standard would be issued.218 For both
political and legal reasons, it would have been unlikely that the
Secretary would claim, and the court would approve, criteria which
would lead to a decision to decline to promulgate and enforce a
regulation because of Title VII considerations. A recent decision
from the Fifth Circuit confirmed this conclusion in another context
by holding that OSHA is authorized to act for the sole purpose of
protecting employee safety and health, not to regulate job secur-
ity.214 Regulating or failing to regulate in deference to Title VII
considerations, apparently would so protect employees in their
choice of occupation as to be considered a regulation of job security,
and thus be outside the scope of OSHA's authority.
C. Acceptable Risk
When dealing with toxic or cancer-causing substances, human
activity will always and unavoidably involve risks. If a statute or
standard required the elimination of all risk, it could be complied
with only by eliminating human exposure. Accordingly, society
must be willing to evaluate relative risk and accept some degree of
risk, a concept commonly regarded as acceptable risk.
215
In enacting OSHA and giving the Secretary the authority to
promulgate standards dealing with toxic materials, Congress ex-
plicitly recognized in its "feasibility" requirement 216 the impos-
212. National Congress of Hispanic Am. Citizens v. Marshall, 626 F.2d
882, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted).
213. Id. at 890-91.
214. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 599
F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1979).
215. In society, the principle of acceptable risk is well established. The
fact is inherent in any endeavor. The laws under which OSHA operates also
recognize the idea of acceptable risk. We do not and cannot have a risk-free
society, and it is not useful to propose regulation rooted in such an idea.
Acceptance of the reality of risk is not, however, without reluctance. The most
absolute requirement of OSHA providing a safe and healthy workplace for
every worker is unachievable. As we move from the implausible, however,
to the feasible, an inevitable set for choices appears-how much risk is reason-
able, how much is acceptable? See W. LOWRANcE, OF ACCEPTABLE Risx: Sci-
ENCE AND THE DETERMINATION OF SAFETY (1976); Singer, How to Reduce Risks
Rationally, 51 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 93 (1978); Sowby, Radiation and Other
Risks, 11 HEALTH PHYsICs 879 (1965); Rothschild, Coming to Grips with Risk,
Wall St. J., March 13, 1979, at 22, col. 4.
216. See notes 151-59 and accompanying text supra.
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sibility of assuring American workers a risk-free workplace or of
protecting workers by putting them out of work. In fact, with
regard to carcinogens, existing scientific knowledge indicates that
zero risk, although an appropriate regulatory goal for some sub-
stances, is not achievable without zero exposure.217  Moreover, car-
cinogens occur in so many different consumer products, industrial
raw materials, and commercial or industrial wastes that completely
eliminating exposure, even if possible, would in many cases have
unacceptable economic, social, and even health impacts.218  In this
respect, therefore, the congressional mandate quite properly was
limited to adequately assuring, as far as possible, that workers do
not suffer from a "material impairment of health or functional
capacity." 219
Various formulations have been used to define acceptable risk.
It is sometimes defined in terms of risks that people are observed
to accept. One problem with this is that risk and degrees of risk,
as well as safety and degrees of safety, evolve according to individual
perceptions and social standards of acceptability. One commentator
has suggested that there are natural boundaries to risk, delineated
by the high risk of communicable disease mortality and the low
risk of natural disaster mortality, between which people accept
exposure in daily life.22 0 Economists have suggested that premi-
ums for hazardous occupations define acceptable risk.22 1 In order
217. Carcinogen Standard, supra note 10, at 5138-39, 5178, 5200-01; IRLG
REPORT, supra note 32, at 14. Dose response data cannot identify a no-effect
level for carcinogens. Interim Policy and Procedure for Classifying, Evaluat-
ing, and Regulating Carcinogens in Consumer Products, 43 Fed. Reg. 25,658,
25,663 (1978).
218. IRLG REPORT, supra note 32, at 15; Regulatory Council Statement,
supra note 34, at 15.
219. 29 U.S.C. §655(b)(5) (1976). Section 6(b)(5) as originally proposed
would have required OSHA to assure that "no employee will suffer any im-
pairment of health." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 119, at 367. Even the
sponsors of the legislation, such as Senator Dominick, realized that this require-
ment was inherently unrealistic because it could be read to give OSHA the
authority to regulate or "ban all occupations in which there remains some
risk of . . . impaired health." Id. Senator Dominick therefore urged that the
requirement be eliminated, explaining, "the difficulty of the language I am
trying to delete is the requirement that . . . [OSHA], in establishing
standards must assure that there will not be any risk at all." Id. at 481. In
response to an amendment proposed by Senator Dominick, the original lan-
guage was deleted, and §6(b)(5), including the word "material," was revised
in the form ultimately approved by both houses. Id. at 502-03. Thus, the
upgrading of working conditions, not the complete elimination of hazardous
occupations, was the dominant intention of Congress.
220. See W. LowRANcE, supra note 215.
221. Our reality is a mixture of wage premiums based on an implicit
degree of hazard and the acceptance of risks as a fact of life among multiple
other risks, both voluntary and imposed. Economists have found that workers
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for implicit or explicit risk markets to work well enough to define
acceptable risk, however, the nature of the risks must be under-
stood, and their acceptance must indeed be voluntary.
2m
Any assessment or determination of a health risk must take into
account the toxicity or carcinogenicity of a substance and the level
and means of exposure to the substance.228 Even in the emotional
context surrounding cancer, sound public policy must take into ac-
count the inevitability of some risk and the necessity of evaluating
such risk, not only against alternative risk but also in light of the
economic and social costs and benefits of the substance being regu-
lated.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) historically has
considered it inappropriate to balance the risk of cancer that may
be associated with the use of an agent against the benefits that may
be derived from the agent's use. In a recently published proposal,
2 24
receive a greater percentage of hazard premiums in industries where the ac-
cidental death rate is twice that of industries requiring comparable skills.
Starr, Benefit Costs Studies and Sociothechnical Systems, in PERSPECTIVES ON
BENEFIT RISKS DECISION MAKING 38 (1972).
While efforts must be made to preclude danger rather than provide hazard
premiums, the imperfection of our world means that all risks cannot be elimi-
nated. The determination of risk acceptability is a two-step process, consisting
of the objective process of risk assessment followed by the normative-subjective
social determination of safety. The decision to accept job-connected risks de-
mands that those put at risk be given a full and complete review of the risk
assessment process. Attempts must be made to relate the degree of risk with
the risks of other life activities, voluntary and imposed. While the difficulties
in making such a comparison will be taxing, there is no other readily accessible
or acceptable approach. See Oi, On the Economics of Industrial Safety, 38
L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 669, 699 (1974); What Price Safety? The Zero-Risk De-
bate, 114 DUN'S REv. 49 (1979) (physical risk to life from various hazards can
be quantified, by using complex mathematical formulas known collectively as
risk-benefit analyses, an accurate determination can be made as to whether a
given safety program is worth the money it costs).
222. Human exposure in the workplace is controllable and voluntary.
Understanding the degree and nature of the potential exposure permits some
measure of control of risks associated with a chemical that has intrinsic toxic
potential. After assessing the toxic potential of the chemical, the potential for
human exposure, and the risk, an acceptable exposure level should be estimated
taking into consideration the degree of confidence in the data and the variability
of the population at risk. A zero-risk exposure level is not useful public policy.
A country that accepts 200,000 deaths per year associated with smoking and
20,000 deaths from not buckling seatbelts will not and, to be consistent, should
not pursue to extremes risks posed by environmental contaminants.
In the setting of the workplace, Dinman suggests that imposition of a risk,
on other than a voluntary basis, would be unacceptable. Complete disclosure
of risks is a sine qua non. Full disclosure should also be understood to include
an exposition of what is not known or unclear, for the picture changes when
the risks are less certain. See Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and
Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 215 (1978).
223. IRLG REPORT, supra note 32, at 9.
224. Chemical Proponents in Food Producing Animals: Criteria and Pro-
cedures for Evaluating Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,070
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however, the FDA became the first governmental agency to sug-
gest an acceptable lifetime cancer risk level set at one in one mil-
lion, a substantial reversion downward from the prior one in 100
million level, which was felt to be unduly limiting without substan-
tial compensation in terms of public health.225 This is a similar
approach to that adopted earlier by the EPA in the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, the purpose of which is to control "unreason-
able risks" of chemicals and chemical mixtures.26  Similarly, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is directed to promul-
gate only standards that are reasonably necessary to prevent or re-
duce an unreasonable risk of injury.227  The recent judicial
decisions which emphasize a cost-benefit analysis under OSHA also
support an acceptable risk formulation with its correlation of
economic feasibility to reasonable necessity.228 The promulgation
and enforcement of a standard, therefore, will depend upon a proper
balance between the protection afforded by the requirement and
the effect upon economic and market conditions in the industry.22
9
(1979). See also FDA Procedures To Minimize Medical X-Ray Exposure of the
Human Embryo and Fetus; Recommendations for Medical Radiation Exposure
of Women of Childbearing Potential, 44 Fed. Reg. 66,616 (1979) (risk due to
radiation exposure cannot be reduced to zero).
225. 44 Fed. Reg. 17,092-93.
226. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976). See Slesin & Sandier, Categorization of
Chemicals Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 359 (1978).
In general, a determination that a risk associated with a chemical substance or
mixture is unreasonable involves balancing the probability that harm will occur
along with the magnitude and severity of the harm against the effect of the
proposed regulatory action on the availability of the benefits of the substances
or mixture to society. H.R. REP. No. 94-1351, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-15 (1976).
The balancing process does not require a formal cost-benefit analysis under
which a monetary value is assigned to the risks associated with a substance and
to the cost to society of proposed regulatory action on the availability of such
benefits. Id.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (1976).
228. See notes 167-77 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court
recently indicated that the Act's requirement that workplaces be safe is not the
equivalent of making them risk-free:
If the purpose of the statute were to eliminate completely and
with absolute certainty any risk of serious harm, we would agree that
it would be proper for the Secretary to interpret §§ 3(8) and 6(b)(5)
in this fashion. But we think it is clear that the statute was not de-
signed to require employers to provide absolutely risk-free workplaces
whenever it is technologically feasible to do so, so long as the cost is
not great enough to destroy an entire industry. Rather, both the
language and structure of the Act, as well as its legislative history, in-
dicate that it was intended to require the elimination, as far as feasible,
of significant risks of harm.
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2864
(1980).
229. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 941 (1976); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). In
1980-81]
51
Nothstein and Ayres: Sex-Based Considerations of Differentiation in the Workplace: Exp
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Any attempt to quantify and incorporate the idea of acceptable
risk into the Act must first define the risk. A quantitative risk as-
sessment must take into account the toxicity or carcinogenicity of
a substance and the level and means of exposure, and must include
qualification in light of the identifiable biologic and toxicologic
differences presented in the exposed human population.2 0  Risk-
benefit, a variation of the cost-benefit analysis, must then be utilized
to present a full set of choices with appropriate data on costs, bene-
fits, and hazards attendant to each option. Acceptable risk will
vary with the benefit anticipated and the problem perceived.
Once an acceptable risk is established, voluntary acceptance
thereof must be mandated.231 People appear willing to accept vol-
untary risks about 1000 times greater than they would tolerate in-
voluntary risks that provide the same level of benefit.23 2 Acceptable
risk, therefore, may depend greatly on the way in which relevant
information is presented and perceived.23 8  Efforts should be made
to increase workers' rights to know about chemical hazards. Ef-
fectively presented, scientifically accurate information about the
toxic substances with which one works, including known or poten-
tial deleterious genetic effects, will motivate the workers who are
contemplating parenthood or who are pregnant to give some thought
to their placement and job categories.
Reserve Mining, the court, reviewing evidence on the potential carcinogenic
effect of the discharge of taconite tailings into Lake Superior, was unable to
find that the "probability of harm [was] more likely than not." 514 F.2d at
520. In Ethyl Corp., the court upheld EPA's regulation of leaded gasoline
based on the determination that lead posed a "significant risk" to public health
and rejected arguments that proof of either actual or probable harm was neces-
sary. 541 F.2d at 14. See also Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act,
7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1976) ("unreasonable risk to man or the environment" in-
cludes consideration of "economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits
of the use of any pesticide").
230. Starr, Social Benefit v. Technological Risk, 165 SCIENCE 1232 (1969).
231. The following actions should be considered: (1) employees who may
be affected should be informed of the possible consequences of exposure to toxic
substances and appropriate safe handling procedures; (2) engineering controls,
augmented by administrative controls, should be used to reduce and maintain
exposure to toxic substances at acceptable levels; (3) whenever engineering and
administrative controls are not practical to keep exposures at or below accept-
able levels, the use of personal protective equipment should be required; (4)
when there is a potential for exposure to a toxic substance for which an accept-
able exposure level cannot be established due to inadequate data, economic
cost, or technological infeasibility, women and men of reproductive potential
should be excluded from the work area; and (5) when engineering and admin-
istrative controls augmented by personal protective equipment are inadequate
to insure acceptable levels of exposure to toxic substances, women and men of
reproductive potential should be excluded from the work area.
232. Starr, supra note 230.
233. Scientific Bases, supra note 33, at 249.
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It may be argued, however, that this approach would not,
could not, and should not be extended to the fetus, due to a lack
of jurisdiction. OSHA's mandate is to assure safe and healthful
working conditions for persons covered under the Act, that is,
"every working man and woman" in the workplace. 84  This may
not include a fetus, for a fetus is not a worker and, at least prior
to viability, is not a person. The Supreme Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade 285 may be interpreted to indicate that an embryo
could be thought of as part of the mother and, therefore, regulable
as part of her health, but a more accurate reading may be that
the embryo is a "potential life," not simply a maternal organ. The
mother has exclusive power over that potential life by virtue of her
privacy interest, at least to the end of the first trimester.2 6 Pre-
cisely because her right stems from the protected right of privacy,
OSHA may be without constitutional authority to regulate in this
area, except perhaps to mandate informed consent on the part of
the mother.28 7 Any other attempt to control the conditions of
234. The term "person" is defined in § 3(4) of the Act, as "one or more
individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, business trusts, legal repre-
sentatives, or any organized group of persons." 29 U.S.C. § 652(4) (1976).
235. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Constitution does not define person al-
though the term is used in numerous places. Id. at 157. "But in nearly all
these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only post-
natally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal
application." Id. at 157 (footnote omitted). The word person as used in the
Constitution does not include the unborn. Id. at 162. One could argue, how-
ever, by virtue of the Court's acceptance of a legal standard focusing on viability
(that state of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be
preserved indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life support
apparatus), that at that moment the fetus becomes a person. Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 160. The
problem is that the time for viability cannot be set in precise terms; it is usually
placed at about seven months but may occur as early as 24 weeks. 410 U.S.
at 160.
236. In Roe v. Wade, the Court stated, however, that the pregnant woman
cannot be isolated in her privacy. 410 U.S. at 159. The situation is not abso-
lute and "it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some
point in time [as the woman approaches term] another interest, that of health
of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved."
Id. The Court concluded that the state's interest in potential life did not be-
come compelling until viability. Id. at 163. Possibly at this point in time,
OSHA may regulate fetal exposure to toxic substances. The problem is that
by then the damage may have already occurred. See notes 60-61 and accom-
panying text supra.
237. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). In Danforth,
the Court held that a state may not constitutionally require the consent of the
spouse as a condition for abortion of the mother during the first trimester of
pregnancy, reasoning that the state cannot delegate veto power to prevent
abortion, when the state itself lacks that right. Id. at 69-70. A requirement
that a woman certify in writing her knowledge of, and consent to, the abortion
procedure, however, was held to be constitutional. Id. at 65-67.
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exposure of the fetus, particularly in the first trimester, may be
viewed in the same manner as a state's attempt to forbid abortion,
and thus, might be expressly outlawed by Roe v. Wade.
D. Access and Removal
1. Access
In many respects, the conflict between OSHA and Title VII
centers around the OSHA definition of a serious violation. The
source of this definition is the general duty clause, which enjoins
the creation of "hazards that are causing or likely to cause death
or serious physical harm." 238 An accident need not be likely in
order for the violation to be serious. The operative consideration
is whether, given the accident, death or serious physical injury is
likely to result.239 The same test has been applied to violations
of specific standards, presumably because employers must be held
to the same standard of care under both subsections of the Act.
240
In addition, the Secretary must prove that the specific standard
applies to the particular employer, that the employer failed to
comply, and that employees had access, meaning exposure, to the
hazard.2
41
In cases of differential susceptibility to exposure, the only way
an employer may be able to comply with the Act without prohibi-
tive expense is to exclude fertile or pregnant workers, that is, those
susceptible, from the workplace. The employer then may claim
that there is no violation because there is no employee exposure to
the hazard.2 42  The access defense against an OSHA standard is
238. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976). See generally Morey, The General Duty
Clause of the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 86 HARV. L. REv. 988
(1973).
239. Dorey Elec. Co. v. OSHRC, 553 F.2d 357, 358 (4th Cir. 1977).
240. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d at 547.
241. Anning-Johnson Co., 4 OSHC 1193, 1197 (1976).
242. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 506; Marshall v.
Knutson Constr. Co., 566 F.2d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1977). In rebutting the lack
of employee exposure defense to OSHA citations, the Secretary of Labor need
not prove actual exposure to a hazard, but he must show that employee access
to the hazard was reasonably foreseeable or predictable because employees
passed within the zone of danger in the course of normal work assignments.
B.F. Goodrich Textile Prods., 5 OSHC 1458 (1977); Zwicker Elec. Co., 5 OSHC
1338 (1977). The risk of exposure must be more than speculative when employ-
ees are not observed working in the area; it must be shown that employees pass
through the area in the course of their work. J.R. Simplot Co., 6 OSHC 1992
(1978); Frank C. Gibson, 6 OSHC 1557 (1978); Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 5 OSHC
1884 (1977).
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clearly legitimate, despite some occasionally confusing dicta. 43 The
importance of this scenario should not be underestimated. Perhaps
a million embryos are potentially exposed to hazardous toxins in
workplaces every year. Even in the absence of OSHA liability, the
potential tort liability is astronomical, 244 let alone the disastrous
medical consequences. If one tenth of one percent of these chil-
dren is incapacitated, the annual cost would run into the billions.2 4
Even if this were practical from an economic standpoint, it would
not be acceptable to society. On the other side, the cost of obtain-
ing zero exposure from a technological standpoint would perhaps be
higher, even assuming it were possible.
If we envision a situation, perhaps quite common, in which
differential toxicity exists and engineering exposure controls are
not feasible, but personal protective apparatus, such as respirators
and protective clothing is available, a practical solution is possible.
The protective equipment isolates the employee from the hazard
and thus eliminates access. At least two difficulties need to be over-
243. See, e.g., Underhill Constr. Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 526 F.2d 53
(2d Cir. 1975); REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1974). The
fact that courts accept the idea of no exposure as a defense means that OSHA's
policy of protecting workers at their jobs cannot and should not be read as a
job security provision. See Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. United States Dep't
of Labor, 599 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1979). Moreover, OSHA's own proposal to
remove workers from their jobs as a method of protection clearly implies that
OSHA's purpose is to prevent illness and injury in the workplace, but not
necessarily while keeping a worker on the job.
244. See Note, Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65
CALIF. L. REV. 111 (1977). The case law is inconsistent with regard to the legal
status of a stillborn fetus within wrongful death statutes, but recovery for pre-
natal injury suffered any time after conception by a child who is born alive has
been permitted under common law. See, e.g., Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp.
139, 380 A.2d 1353 (1977); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal
and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTaE DAME LAw. 349 (1971). In one recent
case, a state supreme court ruled that a child may have an action for injuries
resulting from damage inflicted by an incompatible blood transfusion to its
mother years before it was conceived. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d
348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). And in a precedent-setting decision that could
have broad impact on litigation dealing with births and abortions, an appeals
court has upheld a child's right to sue for damages because it was conceived
and born with a severe genetic defect. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,
106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 489 (1980). See also Comment,
Radiation and Preconception Injuries: Some Interesting Problems in Tort Law,
28 Sw. L.J. 414 (1974); Note, Preconception Torts: Foreseeing the Unconceived,
48 CoLo. L. REV. 621 (1977) (discussing the parent's role in such torts and
whether a cause of action could arise against the parent); Note, Preconception
Injuries: Viable Extension of Prenatal Injury Law or Inconceivable Tort?, 12
VAL. U.L. REv. 143 (1977) (discussing the child's right to be born with a sound
mind and body-the unborn is owed a duty of care from the moment of
conception).
245. This is calculable from an estimated maintenance cost for hospital
care of $150/day.
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come, however, in order to implement this relatively simple solu-
tion. The first is OSHA policy. OSHA has determined that since
control methods which "depend on the vagaries of human behavior"
are "inherently less reliable," respirators may not normally be used
to comply with OSHA standards. 246 Perhaps one can be forgiven
for thinking of this attitude as a variety of the unfortunate and
illegal "romantic paternalism" decried by the Supreme Court,
247
combined with excessive reliance on machines. Even the most
naive "worst-case" safety analysis would reveal that the damage
from mechanical failure, without respirators, is likely to be more
severe than the damage from individual carelessness, if safety stand-
ards are enforced properly. If they are not enforced, either alter-
native is an exercise in futility, and a serious or even willful viola-
tion in itself. The second difficulty is OSHA jurisdiction. As
discussed above, 48 OSHA might not have the power to regulate on
the basis of harm to the fetus or potential embryos.
If these problems can be overcome, personal protection may
be the best approach. At least one court already has demanded
that OSHA compare personal and engineering protection on a
cost-benefit basis. 249 Another court has asked OSHA to consider
the possibility that not all workers require the same level of pro-
tection.2 50  Under Title VII, this approach would succeed if one
were able to analogize to a corporate dress and grooming code. The
general rule applied to dress codes is that differential dress require-
ments are permissible as long as they do not interfere with job
opportunities.2 51 Therefore, a successful analogy might depend on
the onerousness of the personal protective equipment. For ex-
ample, a half-face mask presents a much less serious obstacle to
normal behavior than a full-face mask with protective clothing and
supplemental oxygen. On the other hand, a company cannot bur-
den women with a difficulty that men need not suffer, in the ab-
sence of compelling business necessity.
252
246. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. 1910.1025(e) (1980).
247. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977).
248. See notes 234-37 and accompanying text supra.
249. Turner Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d 82, 85-86 (7th Cir. 1977)
(noise standard).
250. United Parcel Serv. v. OSHRC, 570 F.2d 806, 812-13 (8th Cir. 1978).
251. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.
1973); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 389 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 527 F.2d
1249 (8th Cir. 1975).
252. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977) (Title VII).
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The final lead standard issued by OSHA includes a provision
entitled Medical Removal Protection (MRP), which is a protective,
preventive health mechanism integrated with the medical surveil-
lance provisions of the standard.25 3  MRP provides temporary re-
moval from the workplace of workers discovered to be at a health
risk from continued exposure to lead.254 It also provides temporary
economic protection by requiring the employer to maintain the
worker's earnings, seniority, and other employment rights and bene-
fits during removal as though the worker had not been removed.2 5
Temporary medical removal is mandated for any worker hav-
ing a blood level at or about 60 jug/100g of whole blood, for any
worker having a blood level at or above 50 yg/100g of whole blood
253. Lead Standard, supra note 49, at 52,972.
254. Id.
255. Id. Extended discussion of rate retention is beyond the scope of this
article. It appears, however, to be illegal, in direct conflict with an express
provision of the Act, and at odds with national labor policy. OSHA only has
authority to mandate practices that are reasonably necessary or appropriate to
provide safe and healthful employment and places of employment. Standards
that serve to lessen or eliminate a hazard, to decrease exposure to a hazard, to
warn of the existence of a hazard, to monitor the existence or effect of a hazard,
or to keep records of employee exposure to a hazard may be valid because they
lead to safe employment and safe places of employment. Rate retention is
different as it is nothing more than a subsidy imposed on employers to induce
their employees to obey the law. It mandates job security, which is not the
purpose of the Act. See Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 599 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1979). Moreover, if a woman were transferred at
protected pay and seniority levels to another job, could not a man earning less
than the transferred woman at the same job sue for equal pay? An appropriate
analogy may be to employment of the handicapped under the Vocational Re-
habilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976). Under this law, an employer is
expected to make reasonable modification in order to employ the handicapped.
This modification does not include pay for a job the employee is unable to
perform. Despite these arguments, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit recently approved the rate retention aspects of the
cotton dust standard. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 56, 68 (1980) (petitioners granted certiorari separately).
The removal and protection requirements could have a dramatic impact
on collective bargaining. By imposing through regulatory fiat what the unions
have been unable to obtain at the bargaining table, OSHA has intruded im-
properly into the area of collective bargaining. The well-established national
labor policy of encouraging employers and the representatives of employees to
establish through negotiation their own charter for the ordering of industrial
relations, and thereby to minimize industrial strife without concerning the
government with the terms upon which the parties have agreed, has been ig-
nored by mandating rate retention. See Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
Rates of pay and seniority of workers transferred to jobs other than their usual
positions have long been recognized as mandatory subjects of collective bargain-
ing. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). Proper balancing re-
quires OSHA to leave such matters to the collective bargaining process.
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averaged over a previous six-month period, and for any worker
found by a medical determination to be at risk of sustaining ma-
terial impairment to healthy.2 6 Workers are to be returned to their
former job status when removal is no longer necessary to protect
the worker's health.
25 7
There is no time limit specified for the temporary medical re-
moval of a worker found to be at a risk of sustaining material
impairment to health. Thus, removal from the workplace to pro-
tect workers' health is approved by OSHA, which states in the
standard that a fraction of workers will not be adequately protected
even if an employer fully complies with all provisions of the stand-
ard.258 Specifically, OSHA states that
temporary medical removal may in particular cases be
needed for workers desiring to parent a child in the near
future or for particular pregnant employees. Some males
may need temporary removal so that their sperm can re-
gain sufficient viability for fertilization; some women may
need temporary removal to slightly lower their blood lead
levels so that prior lead exposure will not harm the
fetus.2
5 90
Finally, the standard indicates that some segments of the lead in-
dustry will take many years to completely engineer out excessive
plant air lead emission.260  During this time, reliance will have to
be placed on respiratory protection supplemented by temporary
medical removal when necessary. 261  Conceivably, then, removal
from the workplace, while anticipated to be used for a maximum of
eighteen months, could last several years.
256. Lead Standard, supra note 49, at 52,972. The standard also cautions
that lead poisoning may occur below the blood lead level of the removal
criteria, and that a non-work-related medical condition may be worsened by
lead exposure. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 52,973.
259. Id. at 52,974 (emphasis added).
260. Id. at 52,973.
261. Id. OSHA delayed from March 1, 1981 to April 1, 1981 its implemen-
tation of the third year trigger levels for medical removal protection under
the lead standard which require removal at 60 yg/100g and return at 40
pg/100g. 46 Fed. Reg. 14,897 (1981). The one month delay was to facilitate
submission and evaluation of comments by employers and unions on the feasi-
bility of the new levels. Id. Various employers, which have petitioned for a
one-year delay, have indicated that the new levels are infeasible at present and
would require removal for lengthy periods of many skilled employees. Id.
In response, several unions have opposed any delay which is not limited to
those employers which have demonstrated serious feasibility problems. id.
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The lead standard is not the only standard in which OSHA
recognizes and requires differentiation on behalf of a particular
group which may have special susceptibility to a toxic substance
and which cannot be protected, even temporarily, by the use of
respirators. In the cotton dust standard, handicapped persons,
meaning those who are at increased risk due to diminished pul-
monary function, are earmarked for special protection. In the
event an employee is unable, because of his or her handicap, to
wear a respirator, permanent medical removal, with wage and bene-
fit retention, is provided.
262
In two recent decisions, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit has upheld both the lead and the cotton dust
removal provisions.263  In the cotton dust decision, the court held
that the provision comes within OSHA's authority under section
3(8) of the Act to include in its standards such practices, means,
methods, operations, and processes that are reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide a safe or healthful place of employment and
necessary to protect workers from losing their jobs.26 In approving
the lead standard's MRP, the court found the provision to be well
within the general scope of OSHA's power, and a reasonable exer-
cise of that power. 26 The District of Columbia Circuit's approval
262. The relevant removal provision states:
Whenever a physician determines that an employee is unable to wear
any form of respirator, including a power air purifying respirator,
the employee shall be given the opportunity to transfer to another
position which is available or which later becomes available having a
dust level at or below the PEL. The employer shall assure them [sic]
an employee who is transferred due to an inability to wear a respirator
suffers no loss of earnings or other employment rights or benefits as a
result of the transfer.
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043(f)(2)(v) (1980). Although the acrylonitrile standard
contains no similar removal provision, the summary and explanation of the
standard stated that OSHA may consider whether the conditions for its invo-
cation set forth in the lead standard are applicable to acrylonitrile. Final
Standard for Occupational Exposure to Acrylonitrile (Vinyl Cyanide), 43 Fed.
Reg. 45,762, 45,809 (1978) (codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1045 (1980)).
263. See United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 8 OSHC 1810 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F. 2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct.
56, 68 (1980) (petitioners granted certiorari separately).
264. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 634, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted,
101 S. Ct. 56, 68 (1980) (petitioners granted certiorari separately).
265. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 8 OSHC 1810, 1841-42, (D.C. Cir.
1980). In approving the MRP, the court rejected the industry's argument that
the provision authorized a "strike with pay" situation contrary to congressional
intent. The court also rejected arguments that the MRP violates the Act's
prohibition in § 4(b)(4) of affecting state workmen's compensation laws and
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of these job security provisions 266 is directly in conflict with the
purpose of the Act as defined by the Fifth Circuit in Taylor Diving
& Salvage Co. v. United States Department of Labor.
267
The "Summary and Explanation" section of the cotton dust
standard also recognizes, in the section on pulmonary function
testing, that ethnic and racial differences exist in lung volumes and
functions, which may affect susceptibility to byssinosis. 268 In an
attempt to avoid inadvertently fostering discrimination in hiring
practices, 269 OSHA requested information on formulas that could
be used for evaluating results of pulmonary function among ethnic
groups in order to provide a proper interpretation of spirometry
measurements for blacks. Based on the information received, a
0.85 adjustment factor was incorporated into the final standard to
compensate for the racial differences in lung function.
270
The above examples demonstrate that OSHA has taken into
account the inherent differences in susceptibility to exposure to
toxic or hazardous substances in certain groups who thereby would
be at increased risks. Due to the susceptibility of these groups -
be it based on sex, race, ethnic background, or physical handicap -
OSHA has mandated specific affirmative action on the part of
employers, requiring, in large measure, removal of the employees
from the area in which the hazardous substances exist. In doing
so, OSHA specifically relied on its mandate to assure that no em-
ployee will suffer material impairment of health or functional ca-
national labor policy. Moreover, it stated that the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980), did not address
and does not bear on this issue.
266. The court was aware that, absent these provisions, some employees
were likely to lose their jobs, noting that
certain employees will be incapable of even wearing a PARP [powered
air purifying respiriator]. An employee under such circumstances, in
the absence of some opportunity to transfer to a position where a
respirator need not be worn, might very well be discharged, or other-
wise sustain economic loss, due to his or her inability to wear a
respirator.
AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 674 n.243 (1979), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct.
56, 68 (1980) (petitioners granted certiorari separately), quoting 43 Fed. Reg.
27, 387 (1978).
267. 599 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1979) (sole purpose of OSHA is protecting
the health and safety of workers, not regulating job security).
268. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,391 (1978).
269. Id.
270. Id. (codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043(h)(2)(iii) (1980)).
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pacity on the job.27' Thus, employers who comply with the Act
by discriminatory standard-setting arguably violate Title VII. In
addition, private parties may be entitled to injunctive relief.
272
V. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF DIFFERENTIATION
FROM THE VANTAGE POINT OF TITLE VII
The preceding sections of this article have focused primarily
upon the safety and health aspect of employment differentiation on
the basis of sex. Such differentiation, of course, need not be under-
taken solely in response to government fiat. Indeed, for whatever
motive, employers have justified and probably will continue to jus-
tify treating females differently on the basis of safety and health
considerations. This article will now examine the two major as-
pects of employment differentiation under federal discrimination
laws. First, a substantial discussion will be undertaken of the use
by employers of safety and health considerations to justify sex
differentiation, in the absence of federal safety and health standards.
As will become apparent, the legality of such differentiation is a
relatively straightforward proposition.
The second aspect of an employer's decision to differentiate for
safety and health reasons, when a federal standard exists, is sig-
nificantly more troublesome. To illustrate, assume that a federal
official, such as the Secretary of Labor under OSHA, has promul-
gated standards that, as written or applied, require employers to
differentiate on the basis of sex. In such a case, the employer would
appear to be faced with a dilemma. The employer may either
violate the safety and health standard by not discriminating, or vio-
late discrimination laws by following the safety and health stand-
ard. The latter part of this section of the article will discuss the
extent to which the apparent dilemma can be circumvented through
various legal doctrines, including the right of privacy, agency-level
cooperation between OSHA and the EEOC, and affirmative de-
fenses such as the bona fide occupational qualification.
271. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
272. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
567 F.2d 429, 454-55 & n.171 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Oshiver v. Court of Common
Pleas, 469 F. Supp. 465, 648 (E.D. Pa. 1979). OSHA may also be liable to
private parties under the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment.
Discussion of the latter possibility must be deferred. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that it has been held in a recent case that no private right of action exists
under OSHA. Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1980).
Further, the Secretary of Labor cannot be sued for negligence under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, because his duties are sui generis and do not resemble
those of a private person. Davis v. United States, 536 F.2d 758, 759 (8th Cir.
1976), affirming 395 F. Supp. 793 (D. Neb. 1975).
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A. Ramifications of Sex Discrimination in the Workplace Under
Title VII in the Absence of Federal Safety and
Health Regulations
1. Whether Employment Differentiation on the Basis of Sex is
Covered Under Title VII
The most significant federal proscription of sex discrimination
in employment is Title VII.273 Overt sexual discrimination is un-
likely to be justified by employers on the basis of safety and health
considerations. For example, a company that utilizes toxic sub-
stances generally is not going to restrict better paid, but more dan-
gerous, positions to males on the grounds of safety and health.
Such a blatantly discriminatory restriction would almost surely be
unlawful under Title VII, absent extreme circumstances. More
likely, the company would exclude pregnant women or workers
with reproductive capacities from these positions, claiming that this
specific trait, rather than sex per se, is what requires protection on
safety and health grounds.
Legal analysis of differentiation on the basis of pregnancy or
reproductive capacity has evolved rapidly since the enactment of
Title VII. A discussion of the topic can be divided into three
distinct time periods. The dividing line between the first and
second periods occurred on December 7, 1976, the day the Supreme
Court announced its decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,274
an opinion which marked a significant departure from prior deci-
sions on the legality of differentiation' on the basis of pregnancy
under Title VII. The third period began on October 31, 1978,
273. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). Government classifications based
upon sex can also violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Classifications based upon
pregnancy, however, absent a showing of pretext "designed to effect an in-
vidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other," do not
violate the equal protection clause. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20
(1974). Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently held that § 1985(e) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 may not be relied upon to remedy employment dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny,
442 U.S. 366 (1979). Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, however,
can sometimes be utilized by individuals claiming sex discrimination. See,
e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Finally, in addi-
tion to anti-discrimination laws, relief may sometimes be obtained under the
grievance and arbitration procedures of a collective bargaining agreement.
See, e.g., Olin Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 291 (1979) (Knudson, Arb.)
Scompany did not violate collective bargaining agreement by excluding women
from a job that involved exposure to lead, where lead posed a danger to preg-
nant employees).
274. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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the day President Carter signed a bill amending Title VII, which in
part overruled the Gilbert decision, by prohibiting employment
discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related
medical conditions .. 27
Prior to Gilbert, a disability plan's exclusion of pregnancy-
related disabilities violated Title VII, pregnancy discrimination
being equated with sex discrimination.27 6  Gilbert, along with a
second major Supreme Court decision on the issue, Nashville Gas
Co. v. Satty,27 7 rejected the earlier lower court decisions and estab-
lished a highly uncertain standard by which to determine whether
pregnancy differentiation constitutes unlawful sex discrimination
under Title VII.
278
The Gilbert Court addressed the legality of a disability plan
that covered nonoccupational sicknesses and accidents for all em-
ployees but excluded all disabilities arising from pregnancy.
279
Relying primarily on its prior decision in Geduldig v. Aiello,
2 0
which arose under the fourteenth amendment rather than Title
VII, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the disability pro-
gram,28' a result that was directly contrary to both "the unanimous
conclusion of all six Courts of Appeals that had addressed this ques-
tion," 282 and an EEOC guideline.283  The Court, in an opinion
275. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. III. (1979)).
276. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1037 (1977); Communications Workers
v. American Tel. &c Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated, 429 U.S.
1033 (1977) (remanded for further consideration in light of Gilbert); Wetzel
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictional
grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
277. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
278. For a discussion of the "difficulties of the Court's [then] current treat-
ment of Title VII gender discrimination," see The Supreme Court 1977 Term,
92 HARv. L. REv. 1, 299 (1978). A third Supreme Court case that had mar-
ginal bearing on the issue of pregnancy differentiation is City of Los Angeles
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). See note 300 infra.
279. 429 U.S. at 128-29.
280. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Geduldig involved a disability insurance pro-
gram that was administered by the State of California for the benefit of persons
in private employment. Id. at 486.
281. 429 U.S. at 128.
282. Id. at 146-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, "[a] number of
state courts have held that health and welfare plans which exclude pregnancy
benefits violate state fair employment practice laws." Siegel Sc Ayres, Book
Review (A. LARON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION), 1977 DuKE L.J. 287, 291
n.19.
283. The guideline which was promulgated in 1972 was codified at the
time of the decision in Gilbert in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975). The guide-
line was not given controlling effect for two reasons. First, it was promul-
gated eight years after the enactment of Title VII and thus was not a "con-
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authored by Justice Stewart, first held that "an exclusion of preg-
nancy from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is
not a gender-based discrimination at all." 284 In other words, be-
cause "[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women
are not... [and] no risk from which women are protected and men
are not," 281 pregnancy differentiation was held not to be the
equivalent of sex differentiation. The Court acknowledged that
the program would have been illegal had the exclusion of preg-
nancy disability benefits been a pretext for discriminating against
women. 286  The Gilbert decision held, however, that such a pre-
text could not be inferred from the simple fact that coverage ex-
cluded pregnancy.28 7 Noting further that the plaintiff had not
even attempted to introduce evidence of a violation of Title VII
under the doctrine that a violation occurs if "the effect of an other-
wise facially neutral plan or classification is to discriminate against
members of one class or another," 28 the Court stated that "[a]s
there is no proof that the package is in fact worth more to men than
to women, it is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory
effect in this scheme simply because women disabled as a result of
pregnancy do not receive benefits." 289
The second Supreme Court decision construing the legality of
pregnancy differentiation under Title VII is Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty.290 In Satty, a company required pregnant employees to take
an unpaid leave of absence and eliminated all accumulated job
seniority for those employees returning to work from the forced
temporaneous interpretation" of Title VII. 429 U.S. at 142. Second, earlier
opinion letters issued by the General Counsel of the EEOC contradicted the
guideline. Id. at 142-43.
284. 429 U.S. at 136.
285. Id. at 138.
286. Id. at 135.
287. Id. at 136. The Court concluded that pregnancy was "significantly
different" than the covered diseases and disabilities, and thus the question of
excluding a disease or disability which was confined to the members of one race
or sex was not present. Id.
288. Id. at 137, citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976)
(emphasis in original). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co.,
550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977) (holding that the de-
motion of a female secretary on the basis of her pregnancy had a discriminatory
impact upon women as a class, and hence, was unlawful under Title VII).
289. 429 U.S. at 138. The Supreme Court has subsequently stated that the
Gilbert "holding rested on the plaintiff's failure to prove either facial discrimi-
nation or discriminatory effect." City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
716 n.29 (1978).
290. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
[VOL. 26: p. 239
64
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss2/1
SEX-BASED CONSIDERATIONS
leave of absence. 29 1  At the same time, the company offered paid
leave for non-occupational disabilities other than pregnancy and
retained seniority for persons returning to work from such ab-
sences.29 2  The Court struck down the company's policy of elimi-
nating seniority 213 and remanded the cause for further findings on
the issue of whether the unpaid maternity leave, while facially
neutral, constituted a pretext for sex discrimination.294
The seniority policy was not struck down because it was per se
unlawful, but because it had a discriminatory impact 295 under the
rationale previously employed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
296
Thus, the Court was persuaded that the Nashville Gas Company
had "not merely refused to extend to women the benefits that men
cannot and do not receive, but ha[d] imposed on women a sub-
stantial burden that men need not suffer." 297 Gilbert was dis-
tinguished on the ground that the plaintiff in that case had made no
showing of discriminatory impact.298 With respect to the policy
of unpaid maternity leave, the Court cited Gilbert in support of
the proposition that this type of disability policy is not a per se
violation of Title VII.299 As in Gilbert, differentiation on the
basis of pregnancy was held not to constitute differentiation on the
basis of sex, 300 and the petitioner's unpaid sick-leave plan was held
291. Id. at 137. The effect of the company's policy is to make permanent
job positions available to returning employees only if no presently employed
person applies for the position. Id.
292. Id. at 139.
293. Id. at 141-43.
294. Id. at 143-46.
295. Id. at 141.
296. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 329 (1977).
297. 434 U.S. at 142. The Court reasoned that the elimination of accumu-
lated seniority for employees returning from pregnancy leave deprived those
employees of job opportunities. Id. at 141. The respondent in Satty had been
forced to accept temporary work at a lower salary upon returning from leave,
and subsequently was denied three positions that she would have qualified for
had she been credited with the lost seniority. Id. at 139.
298. Id. at 141.
299. Id. at 143.
300. Id. This holding in Gilbert and Satty was the point of departure
for the later Supreme Court decision in City of Los Angeles v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702 (1978). In Manhart, the Supreme Court struck down a pension
plan that required women to contribute more than men, finding the require-
ment to constitute per se unlawful "facial discrimination" on the basis of sex,
as opposed to Gilbert and Satty which involved the sex-linked factor of preg-
nancy. Id. at 714-16. This distinction between sex discrimination and dif-
ferentiation on the basis of a sex-linked factor, such as pregnancy, was an
important one. The Manhart Court observed:
[Elven if the Department's actuarial evidence is sufficient to prevent
plaintiffs from establishing a prima fade case on the theory that the
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not to have a discriminatory effect.30 ' Because the lower courts
had not considered whether the pregnancy differentiation was a
mere pretext for sex discrimination, however, the Court, once again
following the lead of Gilbert, remanded the cause for further
consideration .
30 2
Congress reacted quickly to the Gilbert decision. Legislation
aimed at overruling Gilbert was introduced in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate within approximately three months
of the Supreme Court's decision.3 08 The bills were designed to
amend the definition of sex discrimination in order to prohibit
"discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions." 804 While enactment took more than nine-
effect of the practice on women as a class was discriminatory, that evi-
dence does not defeat the claim that the practice, on its face, discrimi-
nated against every individual woman employed by the Department.
Id. at 716 (footnote omitted). Accord, EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139,
1145-46 (1st Cir. 1978); In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings, 582 F.2d 1142,
1145 (7th Cir. 1978). Of course, the sex-linked factor analysis is subject to a
wide range of interpretations. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in Manhart,
the pension plan could be regarded as involving the sex-linked factor of longer
female life expectancy, rather than sex per se. 435 U.S. at 724 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part). Justice Blackmun could see no legal distinction between
these two sex-linked factors, and hence concluded that Manhart cut back sub-
stantially on the holding in Gilbert "and, indeed, makes the recognition of
[that case] as continuing precedent somewhat questionable." Id. at 725 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part).
301. 434 U.S. at 145.
302. Id. at 145-46. On the same day that Satty was decided, the Court
remanded for further consideration in light of Gilbert and Satty a decision of
the Ninth Circuit which had struck down a school district's policies of requiring
pregnant teachers to stop working at a predetermined time before the expected
date of delivery and denying sick-pay to such teachers. Richmond Unified
School Dist. v. Berg, 434 U.S. 158 (1977). The Ninth Circuit had held that
pregnancy differentiation constituted sex discrimination, and consequently, the
school district's policies violated Title VII. Berg v. Richmond Unified School
Dist., 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975), remanded, 434 U.S. 158 (1977). Both
policies are now unlawful under the recent amendment to Title VII. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1979). For the pertinent text of the amendment,
see note 305 and accompanying text infra. Accordingly, because the relief
sought in Berg was injunctive, the teacher should prevail on remand with re-
spect to these two policies, to the extent that the issues are not already moot.
303. See S. 995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5055, 5056, 5057 g: 5058,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), all of which were introduced on March 15, 1977.
304. See S. 995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5055, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977). Senator Harrison Williams, then Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Labor of the Committee on Human Resources, stated at the outset of the
hearings to consider the amendment to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy that the Gilbert decision "came as a critical blow to working women
across the country. It constitutes a major setback in the battle for women's
rights and poses a serious threat to the development of antidiscrimination
policies under title VII of the Civil Rights Act." Discrimination on the Basis
of Pregnancy, 1977: Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977). Senator
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teen months, the final legislation went far beyond the scope of the
Gilbert decision in terms of impact upon pregnancy differentiation
in the workplace.3°5
The amendment to Title VII that Congress eventually enacted
modified the definition of sex discrimination to include discrimina-
tion on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
ditions." 306 While the impetus for the amendment was provided
by the decision in Gilbert and its effect upon pregnancy bene-
fits, legislative history compels the conclusion that the prohibi-
tion against sex discrimination under Title VII now "extends to
the whole range of matters concerning the childbearing process."
807
The legislative history of the amendment further emphasizes that
equality of treatment is the touchstone and that disability pro-
Williams further asserted that "by concluding that pregnancy discrimination is
not sex discrimination within the meaning of title VII, the Supreme Court dis-
regarded the intent of Congress in enacting title VII . . . [which was] to pro-
tect all individuals from unjust employment discrimination, including pregnant
women." Id.
305. See PUB. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1979)). The substantive section of the amendment pro-
vides as follows:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe bene-
fit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) shall be
interpreted to permit otherwise. This subsection shall not require an
employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except
where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term, or except where medical complications have arisen from
an abortion: Provided, That nothing herein shall preclude an em-
ployer from providing abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining
agreements in regard to abortion.
Id.
The Senate version passed without difficulty on September 16, 1977. See
123 CONG. REC. 29664 (1977). The House version, however, had a much more
tumultuous chronology, attributable, in large part, to the issue of how abortions
should be treated under Title VII. Even with the utilization of a procedural
tactic to avoid full debate on the House floor, the House version was not passed
until July 18, 1978. See 124 CONG. REC. H6862-70, 6878, 6880 (daily ed. July
18, 1978). Predictably, House and Senate conferees disagreed over the abortion
issue, the House version having provided, unlike the Senate bill, that abortions
need not be covered under benefit plans unless necessary to save the mother's
life or contained in a collective bargaining agreement. In an eleventh hour
compromise, the Senate conferees agreed on an abortion provision on October
13, 1978-two days before Congress was to have adjourned for the year. See
200 DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA) A-11 (Oct. 16, 1978). Finally, on October 31,
1978, President Carter signed the new amendment into law. See 212 DAILY
LABoR REP. (BNA) A-15 to A-17 (Nov. 1, 1978).
306. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (k) (Supp. III 1979).
307. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978).
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grams or funds covering pregnancy need not be established if no
programs exist for any employees. 08 Moreover, even when fringe
benefit programs are in existence, employers are not required to
pay for health insurance benefits for abortions, unless the mother's
life would be otherwise endangered or unless medical complica-
tions arise from an abortion. 09
Since enactment of the 1978 amendments, any employment
differentiation on the basis of pregnancy or reproductive capacity
constitutes sex discrimination per se under Title VII, unless the
employer can establish an affirmative defense. Thus, if a company
excludes pregnant women or workers with reproductive capacities
from better paying, but more dangerous, positions, it can no longer
claim that the exclusion is based upon the specific trait of preg-
nancy, rather than upon sex per se. The next subsection will dis-
cuss the extent to which companies may be able to establish an
affirmative defense to an allegation of unlawful overt sex differen-
tiation or discriminatory impact under Title VII.
2. The Availability of Affirmative Defenses to a Charge of Sex
Discrimination
The most significant affirmative defenses in Title VII disputes
are the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense and
the business necessity defense. In their pristine form, the two
defenses are mutually exclusive; 310 in recent years, however, they
have tended to merge.8 1' The BFOQ defense, which is statutory,
308. See S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
[T]he treatment of pregnant women in covered employment must
focus not on their conditions alone but on the actual effects of that
condition on their ability to work. Pregnant women who are able to
work must be permitted to work on the same conditions as other
employees; and when they are not able to work for medical reasons,
they must be accorded the same rights, leave privileges and other bene-
fits, as other workers who are disabled from working.
Id.
309. For the relevant text of the amendment, see note 305 supra. The
final proviso of the new amendment prohibited employers from complying
with the amendment until October 31, 1979, by reducing the montetary bene-
fits or compensation of any employee. See Act of Oct. 31, 1978, PuB. L. No.
95-555, § 2, 92 Stat. 2076. In other words, benefits had to be increased for
woman rather than decreased for men. If the costs of any benefits were
apportioned between the employer and employees, any increased expenses
related to compliance had to be divided in the same proportion. Id.
310. See B. SCHLEi & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINArION LAW
292-93 (1976).
311. See, e.g., deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674
(9th Cir. 1978); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 310, at 86 (Supp. 1979).
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is based upon section 703(e) of Title VII which states that "it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ...
[to differentiate on the basis of sex] where . ..sex . . . is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise .... It 312 The
business necessity defense, on the other hand, is entirely a judge-
made doctrine.813 The BFOQ defense arises after the plaintiff
has made a showing of overt discrimination, whereas the business
necessity defense is applicable only after a plaintiff has made a
showing that a particular employment practice, while facially neu-
tral, has a disparate impact upon a group protected under Title
VII.814
Some commentators have argued that the BFOQ defense was
intended by Congress to be a rather broad one.315 The Supreme
Court, however, has interpreted the defense as an "extremely nar-
row exception" to the general proscription against sex discrimina-
tion in Title VII.3 16 The Supreme Court first addressed the BFOQ
defense in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,8'7 which involved a
company's policy of refusing to hire women with preschool-age chil-
dren.3 18 While the Court of Appeals had held that this policy
did not constitute sex discrimination, the Supreme Court reversed
in a per curiam opinion.319 The case was remanded, however, to
determine whether a BFOQ could be established from the fact
that conflicting family obligations for women with preschool-age
children might be more relevant to job performance than for
men.320
312. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
313. deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674, 678 (9th
Cir. 1978); Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to
Working Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REv. 55, 67 (1979).
314. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1970); Muller v. United
States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 928 (10th Cir. 1975).
315. See Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occu-
pational Qualification, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1025, 1026-33 (1977) (analyzing the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1965).
316. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). The Court relied
on the restrictive language of the section, the relevant legislative history, and
the interpretation of the EEOC. Id. at 344.
317. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
318. Id. at 543. The company did employ men with preschool-age chil-
dren, as well as women without preschool-age children. Id.
319. Id. at 544.
320. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall argued that the BFOQ
exception should not be construed so broadly as to encompass "ancient ca-
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The second Supreme Court decision construing the BFOQ
defense was Dothard v. Rawlinson.32 1 Dothard involved a challenge
to a state regulation that prohibited women from holding "con-
tact positions" as correctional counselors in maximum security penal
institutions.822 Contact positions were defined as those that re-
quired "continual close physical proximity to inmates of the insti-
tution." 828 While this regulation overtly differentiated on the
basis of sex, the State of Alabama argued that sex was a BFOQ
for that particular position.82 4  In reversing a three-judge district
court panel, the Supreme Court held that the regulation was valid
on the basis of the BFOQ defense.
2
The Dothard court first discussed various tests for the BFOQ
defense used by courts of appeals.326  The Court concluded that
the lower federal courts had agreed that discrimination in hiring
based on "stereotyped characterizations of the sexes" was imper-
missible.12 7  Notwithstanding a determination that the BFOQ ex-
ception was extremely narrow,328 the Court held that sex was a
BFOQ for "contact positions," on the basis of substantial evidence
that the use of women prison guards in contact positions in Ala-
bama maximum security male penitentiaries would pose a security
risk, directly linked to the sex of the guard. 29
In contrast to the BFOQ, the business necessity defense is avail-
able only in discriminatory impact cases. The complaint to which
the business necessity defense is asserted does not challenge an
employment practice because it overtly discriminates against women
but rather because the practice, although neutral on its face, has
321. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
322. Id. at 326.
323. Id. at 325.
324. Id. at 332-33. Because of the regulation, only 25% of the correctional
counselor jobs were available to women. Id. at 332 & n.16.
325. Id. at 336-37.
326. The Court quoted from two decisions of the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 333, quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) ("discrimination
based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business operation would
be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively") (emphasis in
original); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969) (BFOQ defense available only when an employer "had reasonable cause
to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the
job involved").
327. 433 U.S. at 333.
328. Id. at 334. See note 316 and accompanying text supra.
329. 433 U.S. at 336. Contra, Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory,
462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), aff'd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 100 S. Ct. 2942 (1980).
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a discriminatory impact upon women. A good illustration is em-
ployer imposed minimum height standards. Since women statis-
tically are not as tall as men, such height restrictions necessarily
have an adverse impact upon female applicants. Under the ap-
proach first approved by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,3o such a discriminatory impact would render the
height restriction unlawful unless it were job-related or justified
by legitimate business necessity. As the Supreme Court explained
in Dothard, "[t]he touchstone is business necessity . . . ; a dis-
criminatory employment practice must be shown to be necessary
to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII chal-
lenge." 831
In Dothard, female applicants challenged a statutory height
and weight requirement for all prison guards in addition to the
overt prohibition against women holding contact positions. The
opinion set forth the typical "discriminatory impact" scenario in
the following fashion:
[T]o establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a
plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral standards
in question select applicants for hire in a significantly
discriminatory pattern. Once it is thus shown that the
employment standards are discriminatory in effect, the em-
ployer must meet "the burden of showing that any given
requirement [has] . . . a manifest relationship to the em-
ployment in question." If the employer proves that the
challenged requirements are job related, the plaintiff may
then show that other selection devices without a similar
discriminatory effect would also "serve the employer's
legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workman-
ship.' " 382
Applying the above test, the Dothard Court found that the height
and weight restrictions excluded many more women than men.
388
In the hope of establishing a business necessity defense, the State
of Alabama argued that height and weight requirements were job-
330. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs involved the discriminatory impact of
requiring a high school education for employment in or transfer to certain
jobs in which the requirement was not related to job performance. Id. at 425-
26. The Court held that the educational standard violated Title VII because
of its discriminatory impact on black applicants and employees. Id. at 436.
331. 433 U.S. at 332 n.14 (citation omitted).
332. Id. at 329 (citations omitted).
333. Id. at 329-30. Alabama's standards were found to exclude 41.13%
of the female population and less than 1% of the male population. Id.
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related for prison guards, as these requirements related to strength -
an essential quality for a prison guard.88 4 Alabama, however, pro-
duced no evidence "correlating the height and weight requirements
with the requisite amount of strength thought essential to good
job performance." 3s5 Moreover, even if such a correlation had
been present, the Court reasoned that the same purpose could have
been better achieved "by adopting and validating a test for appli-
cants that measures strength directly." 36 Accordingly, the Court
held that Alabama had not established a business necessity de-
fense, and therefore had violated Title VII by using height and
weight requirements8 8'
Assume that an employer excluded pregnant women or women
with reproductive capacities from certain positions on safety and
health grounds. How would the BFOQ and business necessity de-
fenses operate if the exclusion were challenged under Title VII?
For acts occurring prior to the effective date of the 1978 pregnancy
amendments to Title VII, a rule that pregnant employees could
not hold certain positions would not constitute overt discrimina-
tion because, under Gilbert, pregnancy differentiation does not,
per se, equal sex discrimination. s8 Under Satty, however, such a
rule would constitute "a substantial burden [for women] that men
need not suffer." 889 Accordingly, the rule would have a discrimina-
tory impact,840 thereby triggering the business necessity defense.
Because employment differentiation on the basis of pregnancy or
reproductive capacity now constitutes overt discrimination under
Title VII, employers will more frequently raise the BFOQ defense.
Under either analysis, the precise factual situation is of crucial
importance. For example, suppose that a pregnant employee, when
exposed to a certain chemical, becomes particularly susceptible to
spontaneous abortion. If the only risk in such a situation were to
the aborted fetus, the employer would have difficulty establishing a
BFOQ or business necessity defense,841 even if the unborn fetus
334. Id. at 331.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 332 (footnote omitted).
337. Id.
338. See notes 277-89 and accompanying text supra.
339. 434 U.S. at 142. See notes 290-302 and accompanying text supra.
340. See, e.g., James v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 571 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir.);
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978); Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437
F. Supp. 413 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
341. See In re National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. 249, 259 (S.D. Fla. 1977)
("the question of harm to the fetus is basically a decision to be made not by
this court, but by the mother of the fetus").
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were to have a wrongful death or birth action against the em-
ployer. 42 This is because Title VII does not contain a cost-justifi-
cation defense, and additional expense alone is not likely to estab-
lish a BFOQ or business necessity defense.343 If the well-being of
the pregnant employee were also jeopardized by exposure to the
chemical, this result probably would not change. Normally, "the
argument that a particular job is too dangerous for women may
appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title
VII to allow the individual woman to make that choice for her-
self." 344
If a pregnant employee's exposure to a chemical substance
threatened the well-being of other employees, customers, or the
general public, however, different issues would arise with respect to
the BFOQ or the business necessity defense. For example, someone
with a heart condition probably should not be an airline pilot.845
Correspondingly, a pregnant employee who is more likely to become
incapacitated than non-pregnant employees and whose incapacity is
likely to expose other employees or members of the public to pos-
sible harm should not be permitted to operate a mechanical device
near a chemical substance. 346 Similarly, assume that a pregnant
construction worker is responsible for carrying material along the
girders of the twentieth floor of a skeletal structure. If the em-
ployer were to show that pregnant employees are more susceptible
to dizziness when exposed to heights and that members of the pub-
lic walking on the sidewalk below the construction site suffer greater
342. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 335-38 (4th ed.
1971); note 244 supra.
343. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 & n.32 (1978).
See also Sirota, supra note 315, at 1058-59.
344. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 335 (footnote omitted). See also
Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474, 496 (E.D. Va. 1978),
afJ'd in part and rev'd in part, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3643 (1980). In addition to distinguishing the theories of discrimi-
nation by disparate treatment and discrimination by disparate impact, and the
applicable defenses, BFOQ and business necessity respectively, the Court of
Appeals rejected Eastern's contention that its consideration for the safety of the
pregnant flight attendant and her unborn child should be an element of busi-
ness necessity. The Fourth Circuit stated: "If this personal compassion can
be attributed to corporate policy it is commendable but in the area of civil
rights, personal risk decisions not affecting business operations are best left to
individuals who are the targets of discrimination." Id. at 371. See generally
Note, Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 CALIF.
L. REV. 1113, 1130-31 (1977).
345. See Airline Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960).
346. See, e.g., Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 490 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Mich.
1980); Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 689, 692-93
(E.D. Va. 1976), af'd per curiam, 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 934 (1978).
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risk of being injured by material dropped by dizzy employees,
he would have a strong argument in favor of a BFOQ or business
necessity defense.147  Non-pregnancy, in other words, would be
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise" with respect to that particular position.
As the above examples illustrate, one can imagine numerous
factual situations in which an employer could establish a BFOQ or
business necessity defense in order to justify an exclusion of preg-
nant employees or workers with reproductive capacity from par-
ticular positions. The employer would still violate Title VII, how-
ever, if a BFOQ or business necessity defense were established, if
the stated reason for the exclusion were a mere pretext for sex
discrimination. In a disparate impact case, the female employee
might show that reasonable alternatives were present that would
permit the pregnant employee to perform the job, without expos-
ing others to harm. Perhaps the employer could equip the me-
chanical device referred to in the earlier example with a safety fea-
ture that automatically shut off the machine when an employee,
whether pregnant or otherwise, became incapacitated. In the overt
discrimination context, the possibilities for proving pretext are
perhaps even stronger. If an employer exposed males with repro-
ductive capacities to one toxic substance but simultaneously ex-
cluded women with reproductive capacities from positions exposing
them to a different deleterious chemical, the employee probably
would have a successful pretext claim. In other words, if an em-
ployer wants to exclude women from a particular position for con-
cededly legitimate job-related reasons, that employer must treat
similarly situated males in the same manner in order to avoid com-
mitting sex discrimination under Title VII.
B. Ramifications of Sex Differentiation Under Title VII When
Federal Safety and Health Regulations, as Written or
Applied, Require Employers to Differentiate on
the Basis of Sex
As has been discussed previously in this article, certain work-
ing conditions pose greater hazards for pregnant employees or fe-
male employees with reproductive capacities than for males. Other
working conditions pose greater risks for males with reproductive
347. Cf. Comment, Age Discrimination in Employment-the Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification Defense-Balancing the Interest of the Older Worker
in Acquiring and Continuing Employment Against 'the Interest in Public
Safety, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1339 (1978).
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capacities than for women. These limited situations are appropri-
ately termed "sex-specific." The first portion of this section
assumed that no federal safety and health regulations existed for
these sex-specific working hazards. The following discussion will
examine the situation in which a federal agency, usually the De-
partment of Labor under OSHA, has promulgated regulations which
take these sex-linked hazards into account. Indeed, under the gen-
eral duty clause obligation imposed in OSHA, the situation
examined in this section could arise even in the absence of precise
regulations. Assume that such regulations require employers to
differentiate in the workplace on the basis of sex, either by requir-
ing an employer to refrain from promoting a pregnant employee to
a hazardous position or by requiring medical removal of the em-
ployee from such a position. In such a case, the employer would
appear to be placed in a dilemma. Either he could violate the
regulation by not differentiating on the basis of sex, or he could
violate discrimination laws by following the safety and health regu-
lation and refusing to expose the pregnant employee to the sex-
linked hazard. Methods may exist, however, to avoid this dilemma.
1. The Female Employee's Right of Privacy and its Effect Upon the
Constitutionality of Safety and Health Regulation
One possible argument concerning an OSHA standard that
requires an employer to differentiate on the basis of sex is that the
standard, by violating the employee's right of privacy, is unconsti-
tutional.3 48  If the argument was successful, the dilemma between
Title VII and OSHA would be circumvented.
The constitutional right of privacy, whatever its textual
source,34 9 encompasses a myriad of concepts. One recurring con-
348. In addition to the right of privacy, a constitutional challenge to a
sex-specific standard would be possible under the equal protection component
of the fifth amendment's due process clause. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979). To withstand such a challenge, "classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives." Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977),
quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Given that employee safety
and health is an important governmental objective, and safety standards are a
reasonable means to achieve that objective, such a challenge would probably
not succeed even if pregnancy classification is the equivalent of sex classification
under equal protection analysis.
349. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, various
theories were espoused for the existence of a right of privacy. Justice Douglas
relied on penumbral and peripheral rights which emanated from the specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484. Justice Goldberg argued that the
concept of liberty in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, com-
bined with the ninth amendment's evidence that rights existed beyond those
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cept, however, is in the area of childbirth.350 The Supreme Court
has articulated the concept as follows: "If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child." 351 That decision, however, is not absolutely
protected against all governmental intrusion.35 2  The state possesses
certain important interests in this area, which must be balanced
against, and which can outweigh, the individual's right to decide
whether to have a child. 3 3 These include the state's interest in
protecting the health of the pregnant woman and the potential life
of the fetus,3 54 and in encouraging normal childbirth.35r The state
may also have "legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of
population growth." 356
With these competing interests in mind, an OSHA standard
that precluded a male or female worker with reproductive capacities
from performing a particular job might violate that worker's con-
stitutional right of privacy, at least if the only effect of the work-
place hazard was to sterilize that worker. Prior to pregnancy,
there is no state interest in potential life which needs to be pro-
tected. Granted, a woman who loses her ability to reproduce frus-
trates the state's interest in "encouraging normal childbirth" and
controlling "its rate of population growth." However, persons who
are voluntarily sterilized and couples who exercise birth control also
frustrate these state interests. The Supreme Court has established
that a state cannot constitutionally regulate an individual's access
enumerated, established a right of privacy in marriage. Id. at 486-87 (Goldberg,
J., concurring). Finally, Justice Harlan asserted that the right of privacy was
a fundamental right "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," and thus was
part of the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 500
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment), quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See generally Eichbaum, Towards An Autonomy-Based
Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14
HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 361 (1979).
350. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
351. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original).
See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) ("the teaching
of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State").
352. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
353. In Roe v. Wade, the Court stated that since a fundamental right was
involved, only a compelling state interest could overcome the right of privacy.
Id. at 155-56.
354. See id. at 162.
355. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977).
356. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 n.11 (1977).
[VCOL. 26: p. 239
76
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss2/1
SEX-BASED CONSIDERATIONS
to and use of contraceptives.3 7 Were a state to outlaw voluntary
sterilization, such a statute would unquestionably be deemed un-
constitutional as well. Correspondingly, if a woman wants to risk
losing her ability to reproduce in order to earn a living, that
should be her constitutional prerogative.
Suppose, however, that rather than simply sterilizing a female
employee, a chemical substance increased the likelihood of birth
defects in the event that the women did become pregnant and
carry the fetus to term. The state interest "in encouraging normal
childbirth" would increase dramatically. Whether this state interest
would be sufficient to overcome a woman's right of privacy, how-
ever, is an open question.
The seminal decision in this area is Roe v. Wade,358 which
challenged a Texas statute that banned abortion unless necessary
to preserve the life of the mother. The Supreme Court, in holding
the statute unconstitutional, concluded "that the right of personal
privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not
unqualified and must be considered against important state inter-
ests'in [protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal
life]." 359 The impropriety of governmental intrusion into the
pre-conception decision to risk birth defects through exposure to
workplace hazards at first glance seems stronger than in the case
of abortion. In cases subsequent to Roe v. Wade, however, the
Supreme Court repeatedly has focused upon "the central role of
the physician, both in consulting with the woman about whether
or not to have an abortion, and in determining how any abortion
357. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (minors);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 43 (1972) (unmarried persons); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (married couples).
358. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
359. Id. at 154. Elaborating upon this latter theme, the Court outlined
three regulatory stages:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first tri-
mester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the
mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways
that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate
and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appro-
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was to be carried out." 360 A physician typically would not be
consulted concerning the decision to increase the likelihood of birth
defects as a result of the woman's working environment.86' This
absence of the physician from the decision-making process may dic-
tate that the woman's privacy interests should not outweigh the
state's interest in minimizing birth defects. In other words, while
a woman probably has a right to risk her capacity to reproduce and
has the right to sterilize herself to obviate the increased risk of
birth defects from a sex-linked workplace hazard, the state prob-
ably has the right to promulgate safety standards in order to pre-
clude women with reproductive capacity from exposing themselves
to workplace hazards that significantly increase the risk of birth
defects, even before a child is conceived.
In addition to the issue of pre-conception damage, the situa-
tion in which a chemical substance increases the possibility of harm
to either the employee after she becomes pregnant or the fetus
must be considered. Once again, the state has a significant inter-
est in the potential life of the fetus as well as in the pregnant em-
ployee. That interest may be outweighed at times in the abortion
context, where a physician is very much a part of the decision
making process.362  In the context of workplace exposure to a
chemical that could harm the fetus or its mother, however, there is
no role that the physician could meaningfully play. Consequently,
the state's interest in protecting the health of the mother probably
would prevail over the mother's right of privacy, for the same rea-
son that the state has the right to enact legislation aimed at pro-
tecting any employee, male or female. Moreover, under these
circumstances, the state's interest in the unborn child most likely
will prevail over the mother's right to make decisions relating to
childbirth, such that an OSHA standard limiting exposure of preg-
nant employees to a chemical that threatens the life or health of
the fetus probably would not infringe upon constitutional rights
of privacy.
360. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979). See also Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 64; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
361. Of course, once the employee is pregnant, she and her physician could
decide, in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Roe v. Wade, that the
employee should have an abortion. In this limited sense, the physician would
play a meaningful role, because the pregnant employee could have an abortion
in order to obviate the risk of workplace exposure to a chemical that could
harm the fetus. This is far different, however, from consulting with a physician
in the first instance to decide whether to expose the fetus to the harmful
chemical.
362. See note 359 and accompanying text supra.
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2. Agency-Level Cooperation Between OSHA and EEOC -
Particularly With a View Toward Uniform Guidelines
Since both OSHA and EEOC have a recognized interest in
sex-linked workplace hazards, cooperation between the two agen-
cies may be the best way of preventing a conflict between discrimina-
tion laws and safety and health laws. This article previously
discussed the draft interpretive guidelines issued by the EEOC and
the OFCCP, and criticized by OSHA. 63 These agencies should
continue in their efforts to enlist OSHA cooperation and to develop
final uniform guidelines in the area of sex-linked workplace
hazards - much as the EEOC, the Civil Service Commission, the
Department of Justice, and the Department of Labor have developed
the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures in the
employment discrimination context. 64  Continued efforts are im-
portant because if such guidelines were developed and became ef-
fective, they would most likely be authoritative. Agency guidelines,
particularly those promulgated by the EEOC, ordinarily are "en-
titled to great deference" by the courts. 65 Of course, the degree
of deference varies, depending upon "such factors as the timing and
consistency of the agency's position, and the nature of its ex-
pertise." 365 But if the agencies have collaborated to develop one
consistent interpretation, "the principle of administrative deference
intensifies." 367
The proposed guidelines, however, do not attempt to imple-
ment or enforce federal policies related to health and safety; they
only affirm Title VII's goal of assuring equality of employment
opportunity.3 8 The task of assuring a workplace free of condi-
363. See notes 80-96 and accompanying text supra. The guidelines were
issued by the EEOC and the OFCCP, but not by OSHA. The basic role of
OSHA set forth in the guidelines was one of consultation and coordination that
was to be carried out in part through a letter of agreement among the agencies.
Unfortunately, however, the withdrawal of the guidelines moots OSHA's in-
volvement.
364. See 5 C.F.R. § 300.103(c) (1980) (Civil Service Commission); 28 C.F.R.
§50.14 (1979) (Department of Justice); 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1979) (EEOC); 41
C.F.R. § 60-3 (1980) (Department of Labor).
365. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 433-34. See also Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). But see General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 140-45 (1976); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
366. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977).
367. UAW Local 588 v. OSHRC, 557 F.2d 607, 611 n.9 (7th Cir. 1977)
(agreement between the Secretary of Labor and OHSC). Accord, Baird v.
Wagoner Transp. Co., 425 F.2d 407, 411 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829
(1970), quoting Boutell v. Walling, 327 U.S. 463, 471 (1946).
368. See note 80 supra. One final point should be noted. The draft guide-
lines stated that the bona fide occupational qualification exception would not
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tions that threaten the health or safety of employees remains with
OSHA, the federal agency specifically given that responsibility.
Thus a potential for conflict remains, especially in light of OSHA's
statement that the guidelines are a cause for concern. In spite of
this, the draft guidelines, if they become effective, may help to
clarify the sex-linked hazard aspect of Title VII for employers.
3. Compliance With An OSHA Standard As An Affirmative Defense
To A Sex Discrimination Charge Under Title VII
Assume that an OSHA standard requires an employer to ban
pregnant women from working near a given toxic substance after
a certain point in their pregnancy. Could an employer that fol-
lowed the standard claim that its compliance constituted an af-
firmative defense against a female employee who subsequently filed
a sex discrimination charge with the EEOC under Title VII?
An employer might claim that the OSHA standard established
non-pregnancy as a bona fide occupational qualification for the
position in question 30 9 or that following the OSHA standard is a
business necessity, and any discriminatory impact upon women
resulting from the employment practice in question is not unlawful
under Title VII 1 0 Little or no authority exists on this issue.
As is generally the case with these two defenses, however, any
success that an employer might have will turn very much on the
facts involved, especially with respect to a possible showing of
pretext by the employee or the availability of alternatives for the
employer.37' For example, an employer cannot vigorously enforce
OSHA standards against women while ignoring comparable stand-
ards with respect to men.
Section 4 (b)'(1) of OSHA also plays an important role in
this analysis. That section provides, in pertinent part: "Nothing
in this [Act] shall apply to working conditions of employees with
respect to which other Federal agencies . . .exercise statutory au-
thority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting
apply to the situations covered by the guidelines. That narrow exception per-
tains only to situations where all or substantially all of a protected class is
unable to perform the duties of the job in question. Such cannot be the case
in the reproductive hazards setting, where exclusions are based on the premise
of danger to the employee or fetus and not on the ability to perform. See note
90 and accompanying text supra.
369. See notes 314-29 and accompanying text supra.
370. See notes 330-37 and accompanying text supra.
371. See notes 341-44 and accompanying text supra.
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occupational safety or health." 372 If the EEOC falls within this
classification, then the OSHA standard would be pre-empted by
Title VII, and the employer could not rely upon it as an affirma-
tive defense under the analysis described above. 73
While the issue has not been addressed in the courts or by
any agency, Title VII almost certainly does not authorize the EEOC
to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupa-
tional safety and health. Neither the explicit language of Title
VII nor its legislative history evidences any attempt on the part
of Congress to affect occupational safety or health. Indeed, since
equality of treatment is the touchstone under Title VII, an em-
ployer could expose women to the worst possible workplace
hazards without violating Title VII, so long as males were treated
the same way. Accordingly, as long as the OSHA regulation is
valid, it would not be preempted by Title VII and could be relied
upon by the employer as a defense under Title VII.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the lack of clarity con-
cerning evidence of sex-specific susceptibility to toxic substances
in the workplace. Moreover, uncertainty exists as to which toxic
agents affect reproductive capacity, and for those for which there is
certainty, the levels to which exposure must be reduced to obviate
such effects. Add to this the problems generated by the presence
of the fetus in the workplace, the multiplicity of government agen-
cies involved, and the lack of direction among them, 374 and the
confusion quickly becomes chaos: Further, exclusion of one sex
from the workplace clearly will not solve the problems.
OSHA has regulatory authority to protect workers from occu-
pational hazards. Employers have the obligation to protect employ-
372. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1) (1976).
373. Cf., e.g., Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denzed, 434 U.S. 874 (1977) (Federal Railroad Administration regu-
lation in one area does not give industrywide exemption from OSHA regula-
tions); Organized Migrants in Community Action, Inc. v. Brennan, 520 F.2d
1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (EPA pesticide regulations preempt OSHA pesticide
regulations).
374. Under TSCA, the EPA is required to ban or restrict the use of any
chemical presenting an unreasonable risk to health or the environment. A
generally accepted definition of unreasonable risk has yet to emerge. The
EEOC does not appear to be the proper agency to solve the problem either,
for ridding the workplace of hazards clearly is not EEOC's purpose. Since the
main problem is dealing with toxic substances in the workplace, not regulating
the exclusion of the employee from the workplace, EEOC cannot do OSHA's
job through the back door.
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ees from the hazardous workplace. Both OSHA and employers,
however, are handicapped severely by feasibility considerations. In
addition, employers are being whipsawed by a Catch-22 situation
in which they are subject to complaints no matter what policy they
establish. If employees are excluded for health and safety rea-
sons, the employers may be subject to charges of discrimination by
individuals or classes of individuals under Title VII. The OFCCP,
the agency responsible for enforcing nondiscriminatory restrictions
on government contracts, may also initiate compliance investigations
of the employers. If employees are not excluded, NIOSH may
decide to conduct health hazard investigations and epidemiological
studies at the operating locations. The employer also risks personal
injury actions by affected employees.
The only practicable way to handle the problem is for em-
ployers to use the EEOC's Draft Interpretative Guidelines on
Employment Discrimination and Reproductive Hazards as a start-
ing point since the "problem" will be handled on a case by case
basis until effective and uniform involvement of the agencies con-
cerned results in the issuance of definitive administrative guide-
lines. In the interim, employers should consider establishing the
following program aimed at minimizing workplace hazards: (1)
adopt and consistently apply a facially neutral workplace policy
concerning exposure to toxic agents in the workplace; (2) ade-
quately investigate, identify, monitor, and, where feasible, control
all toxic substances in the workplace; (3) identify the toxic or car-
cinogenic effects of those substances; (4) continue to research and
monitor technological developments concerning the identified sub-
stances and the continued application of the policy; (5) identify
on the basis of reputable scientific evidence those groups of work-
ers who are particularly susceptible to hazards of particular toxic
substances; (6) inform those workers of the harmful possibilities
posed by exposure to the toxic substances in the workplace; (7)
advise them of the known or potential deleterious effects and risks
resulting from exposure to the toxic substances on the job; (8)
suggest alternatives if feasible and give the workers the ability to
make an informed choice concerning their actions with respect to
such exposure; (9) require susceptible workers who voluntarily
choose to remain in the workplace to sign a release of liability
(on behalf of themselves and, if applicable, the fetus) after con-
sultation with a physician; and (10) where necessary upon request
of the employee or upon failure of the employee to execute such
a release or as required by an OSHA directive or standard, re-
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move susceptible workers from exposure. Exclusion from the work-
place on any other basis probably will not be supportable, for
the basic framework in this area is straightforward - sex-based dif-
ferential treatment without solid and neutral factual support and
compelling necessity will most likely violate Title VII.
Real health threats from which fetuses, women, and men of
reproductive capacity must be protected do exist in the work-
place. The ideal solution, of course, would be to make the work-
place safe for all workers, but as has been demonstrated, this is a
purely theoretical solution given the present state of even the
most modern industrial plant. Economic impracticability and
technological impossibility bar the way to reducing ambient con-
centrations of toxic agents in the workplace to levels low enough
to protect everyone, male, female, and the fetus. Clearly, man-
dating a zero-risk workplace is not feasible. Other than employing
only hermaphrodites (persons with both male and female repro-
ductive organs), there seems no clear way to avoid or resolve the
conflict between OSHA and Title VII. One statutory mandate
must take precedence; it should be safety and health.
One possible avenue of relief from these conflicting regula-
tions was addressed in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Attorney General
of the United States.375  In that case, relief was sought from the
various officials and agencies of the federal government that created
a morass of regulations and failed to coordinate federal enforce-
ment activity, causing Sears to be faced with conflicting compliance
requirements resulting in discrimination against employees. As the
history of that case revealed (the court dismissed Sears' claim),
however, employers apparently have no right to consistency in
government regulation.3 7 For the present time, the only possible
approach to the problem presented in this article is one of "advise
and consent," with apologies to Allen Drury. The only alternative,
it seems, would be a benign twist on the plot of Aldous Huxley's
1932 novel "Brave New World" in which workers were trained to
tolerate toxic chemicals.
3 77
375. 19 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 916 (D.D.C. 1979).
376. Id. The court's dismissal was based on its conclusion that Sears had
failed to present a justiciable case or controversy. Id.
377. Severo, supra note 3, § 1, at 1, cols. 1-2.
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